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ANIMUS, AND THE ART OF FORECASTING 
MARRIAGE EQUALITY AFTER U.S. V. WINDSOR 
JEREMIAH A. HO* 
ABSTRACT 
 Within LGBT rights, the law is abandoning essentialist approaches 
toward sexual orientation by incrementally de-regulating restrictions on 
identity expression of sexual minorities. Simultaneously, same-sex 
marriages are become increasingly recognized on both state and federal 
levels. This Article examines the Supreme Court’s recent decision, U.S. v. 
Windsor, as the latest example of these parallel journeys. By overturning 
DOMA, Windsor normatively revises the previous incrementalist theory 
for forecasting marriage equality’s progress studied by William Eskridge, 
Kees Waaldijk, and Yuval Merin. Windsor also represents a moment 
where the law is abandoning antigay essentialism by using animus-
focused jurisprudence for lifting the discrimination against the expression 
of certain sexual identities. 
 If the law is shifting from essentialism while veering closer to 
marriage equality, then will these parallel journeys end by reaching a 
constructivist approach to sexual identity? Pure constructivism poses 
thorny risks for attempts to include orientation as a suspect classification 
for heightened scrutiny. As an example, the immutability factor is likely 
to resist constructivist ideas that sexual identity is a choice or a construct. 
Windsor’s use of animus-focused jurisprudence hints at a solution that 
allows the abandoning of essentialism to reach a middle ground because 
animus-focused jurisprudence moves the examination away from whether 
a trait is protectable under equal protection toward the animus that created 
the discrimination within a law itself. This Article explores Windsor’s 
animus-focused jurisprudence as the convergence of both marriage 
equality and incrementalism, and posits normative reasons for sustaining 
this jurisprudence stepping forward. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In early April of 2009, the National Organization of Marriage (NOM) used the 
metaphor of an impending storm in its first anti-marriage equality web-video to 
characterize the institutional threat that it perceived the extension of marriage rights 
to same-sex couples would pose.1 Unlike a mere patch of flowers in May, the effect 
of these torrential April showers, as the ad conveyed, would be catastrophic to the 
rights of non-gay citizens—more likely flood than floral. Titled “Gathering Storm,” 
the video’s message begins with a seemingly-random ensemble of average, everyday 
adults standing before a wall of storm clouds amassing together and unfolding 
angrily, punctuated with an occasional lightning bolt between one ominous moment 
and the next.2 Each member of the ensemble takes turns delivering, with eyes 
directly into the camera, lines from the following message: “There’s a storm 
gathering. The clouds are dark, and the winds are strong. And I am afraid. Some who 
advocate for same-sex marriage have taken the issue far beyond same-sex couples. 
They want to bring the issue into my life. My freedom will be taken away.”3 Then 
after some further sermonizing, the ad climaxes toward a close-up shot on a young 
woman as she utters lines that echo sentiments from the preceding narrative, but this 
time with more dramatic urgency: “But some who advocate for same-sex marriage 
have not been content with same-sex couples living as they wish. Those advocates 
want to change the way I live. I will have no choice. The storm is coming.”4 
                                                                                                                                            
 1 National Organization for Marriage “Gathering Storm” TV Ad, YOUTUBE (Apr. 7, 
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xGi2r-M_gQ8. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
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Although NOM tries to convey that marriage equality is naturally—like a serious 
and encroaching storm—a threat upon the rights of all Americans, a closer reading 
of the advertisement reveals that what NOM asserts as natural actually exists as an 
ideological construct. Shortly after the advertisement had aired, critics of NOM’s ad 
immediately observed the thin smoke-and-mirrors that was NOM’s sturm und drang 
over the inevitability of marriage equality. Frank Rich’s New York Times op-ed 
famously blasted the message, noting that “[i]f it advances any message, it’s mainly 
that homophobic activism is ever more depopulated and isolated as well as brain-
dead.”5 With those sentiments in mind, the soundness of the message’s content is 
called substantially into question and the artifice behind the storm reveals itself a bit 
more evidently. Further close reading of the ad shows that not only the substance of 
the message was artifice, but so are many components of the video that helped stage 
the delivery of that message. For instance, the message was not delivered in a more 
seemingly-organic narrative—perhaps as a vignette or some other situational 
depiction—but rather such delivery was done by speakers directly into the camera, 
breaking that proverbial fourth wall in a way that tries to reproduce a documentary 
or testimonial style. The testifying ensemble of speakers may seem like a sampling 
of everyday people, but in fact they were also constructed purposefully for the ad; 
they were carefully chosen actors.6 Even the storm itself—although magnificently 
dark and foreboding with ultra-fluorescent snaps of lightning—was a computer-
generated effect that swirled indignantly when the message was somber and then 
cleared itself up precisely on cue.   
In this way, NOM’s attempt to liken same-sex marriage as a displacement of the 
status quo becomes suspicious and contrived. What reveals is a construct resembling 
the familiar fear-mongering rhetoric that has convincingly subordinated sexual 
minorities in the past, in which the dominant political force has attempted to justify 
attitudes, policies, and laws that abridge the rights and exclude visibility of sexual 
minorities. By posing an us-versus-them dichotomy through lines such as, “But 
some who advocate for same-sex marriage have not been content with same-sex 
couples living as they wish,” NOM implies that significant enough differences exist 
between gays and straights and that such differences are the highlighted reasons for 
not permitting same-sex couples to marry while continuing to allow different-sex 
couples to do so otherwise.7 
This essentialized approach to marginalizing gays is not new. Harnessing so-
called principles of existence that seem objectively universal but also terribly 
divisive has existed as a way to justify isolating minority groups.8 Differences do 
exist naturally between gays and straights, but are such differences appropriate as 
justification for the categorical denial of rights to gays versus straights? By playing 
up inherent differences that then allows for a split in such treatment, NOM’s 
                                                                                                                                            
 5 Frank Rich, The Bigots’ Last Hurrah, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2009), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2009/04/19/opinion/19Rich.html?_r=3&ref=opinion\&. 
 6 See Kate Pickert, A Storm Over Gay Marriage, TIME (Apr. 10, 2009), http://www.time. 
com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1890523,00.html. 
 7 In this Article, I use the terms “gay,” “homosexual,” and “LGBT” interchangeably. 
 8 See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 
56-58 (2001). 
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message succeeds in showing what critical race theorists have long claimed: that 
essentialism can be used against a targeted minority group.9 
NOM launched the “Gathering Storm” ad at a critical point in the recent marriage 
equality debate—just five months after California citizens had passed Proposition 8, 
redefining marriage in the state as only between a man and a woman, and within the 
same moment states such as Iowa, Vermont, and Maine all moved to legalize same-
sex marriage within their borders.10 This juncture was crucial as restrictive attitudes 
toward marriage equality had started to loosen.11 In this way, the NOM ad was 
reactionary and reaffirming—that California might have foreclosed same-sex 
marriage in 2008, and yet other states were not quite squelching the issue. But the 
failure of essentialism here and the ad’s exposure as construct left its message 
hollow in content and NOM paranoid at best. Numerous parodies of the NOM ad 
that appeared shortly on the web seem to highlight that paranoia of the “Gathering 
Storm” and reveal the absurdity at the crux of NOM’s sentiments against sexual 
minorities.12 The only thing skillfully essentialized was animus and artifice. 
And yet, the NOM message did harbor a small ray of truth with one line: “Some 
who advocate for same-sex marriage have taken the issue far beyond same-sex 
couples.”13 In an odd twist of irony, this particular line—whether read within the 
context of an anti-marriage equality ad or isolated in its entirety—might be the 
single, most accurate statement about the marriage equality movement in that ad. 
The marriage equality issue is indeed far beyond same-sex couples; the issue has 
decidedly more profound implications—implications that, as Steven Colbert’s 
satirical response to the NOM ad precisely underscored, “won’t be solved by 
clearing your web browser.”14 Yet here again, NOM obfuscates that idea and uses 
the line to set up the “potential storm” that leads to inequality, overlooking that the 
implications of marriage equality are less about some threatening intrusion of same-
sex couples into the lives of heterosexuals, and much more about the fundamental 
visibility, inclusion, and acceptance of the gay identity within the terror of 
mainstream American existence. 
The tension between essentialism and social constructivism has almost always 
lurked behind the marriage equality debate, and by extension the movement for gay 
rights, as traditionally the differences characterized by sexual orientation—gay or 
straight—has been fixed from a biological perspective in order to reach the politics 
of marginalization through discourse between nature versus nurture, truth versus 
                                                                                                                                            
 9 Id. 
 10 See Pickert, supra note 6; see also Timeline: Same-Sex Marriage, CNN: THIS JUST IN 
(Oct. 18, 2012, 02:33 PM EST), http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/18/timeline-same-sex-
marriage/. 
 11 See Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RESEARCH RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE 
PROJECT (June 2013), http://features.pewforum.org/same-sex-marriage-attitudes/. 
 12 See Japhy Grant, The 10 Best Responses to the “Gathering Storm”, QUEERTY (Apr. 20, 
2009), http://www.queerty.com/the-best-responses-to-the-gathering-storm-ad-20090420/. 
 13 See Gathering Storm, supra note 1. 
 14 The Colbert Report: Episode 542 (Comedy Central television broadcast Apr. 16, 2009), 
available at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/224789/april-16-2009/ 
the-colbert-coalition-s-anti-gay-marriage-ad. 
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hypothesis, biology versus choice, us versus them. But recently observable within 
the marriage equality movement, the abandonment of essentialism with respect to 
sexual orientation has started gaining momentum in the law. Particularly since the 
Supreme Court decriminalized consensual same-sex intimacy in Lawrence v. 
Texas,15 there has been a progressive undoing of essentialist approaches toward 
sexual minorities traceable along the specific legal path to marriage equality 
promulgated previously and extensively by William Eskridge,16 Yuval Merin,17 and 
Kees Waaldijk.18 In their earlier comparative studies of the rise of marriage equality 
internationally, they have acknowledged a few common legal incremental steps that 
most societies usually undertake in a genuine road toward marriage equality.19 
Conflated together, Eskridge, Merin, and Waadiljk’s theories of incrementalism have 
provided a substantial and workable line of decisional behavior indicative of legal 
and societal changes toward marriage equality successes in numerous states and 
countries. Since their theorizing prior to Lawrence and other recent triumphs for 
sexual minorities, the U.S. has brought their independent and collective hypotheses 
alive on both federal and state levels to set the stage for accomplishing the extension 
of marriage to same-sex couples. 
This Article will explore, on the federal level, the notion that the marriage 
equality movement in the U.S. has progressed onto the last phase of Eskridge, 
Merin, and Waaldijk’s incrementalism. In June 2013, U.S. v. Windsor,20 ushered our 
national, social, and legal imaginations into the final stage of marriage equality’s 
inevitability. Concurrently, the journey along this particularized incrementalism has 
also revealed an observable abandonment of essentialism approaches in the law 
toward sexual minorities. This Article examines how the incremental process toward 
marriage equality has facilitated that abandonment by tracing the way the law has 
dislodged the regulation of identity expression for sexual minorities along each step 
of the Eskridge-Merin-Waadiljk incrementalist approach. From there, this Article 
will then posit that abandonment’s significance, as it reveals more clearly the 
development of animus-focused jurisprudence in order to further the rights of sexual 
minorities. 
Beyond this Introduction, Part II will recapitulate the theory of incrementalism as 
originally proposed by Eskridge, Merin, and Waadijlk, and add to their existing legal 
scholarship by adjusting that path to reflect certain significant developments in the 
law regarding sexual minorities that have taken place since their earlier works. Part 
                                                                                                                                            
 15 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 16 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY 
RIGHTS (2002) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE]. 
 17 YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF GAY 
PARTNERSHIPS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (2002). 
 18 Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the 
Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, 
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 437, 437-68 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenæs eds., 
2001). 
 19 See Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 439-40; ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, 
at xiii-xiv; see MERIN, supra note 17, at 308-09. 
 20 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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III will examine the U.S. variation to that theme of incremental change—through 
Lawrence v. Texas; the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell; and Windsor—and 
determine the journey’s substantial completion on the federal level. Part IV will then 
describe how the undoing of essentialist approaches toward sexual minorities within 
the U.S. variation has produced the rise of animus-focused jurisprudence and end 
with normative considerations on its development post-Windsor. As that 
development is achieved, marriage equality should prove less catastrophic than a 
storm, but no less resonant. 
II. STEP-BY-STEP: THE ESKRIDGE-MERIN-WAALDIJK INCREMENTALISM REVISITED 
A. The Original Theory 
Comparative studies on the incrementalist path toward marriage equality came 
about roughly at the same time during the entrance and adoption of civil unions, 
domestic partnerships, and other “marriage-lite” relationships schemes by 
legislatures across Western countries and individual U.S. states in the 1990s and 
early new millennia. Promulgated by Kees Waaldijk in the Netherlands, and William 
Eskridge and Yuval Merin in the U.S., each of their separate studies observed that 
marriage equality movements internationally succeeded often through a specific 
incremental path propounded by certain sequential changes.21 At the time, these 
studies attempted to shed insight into the particular legal transformations that might 
eventually forecast the inevitability of same-sex marriage within a country or a state 
and also serve normatively as strategies—however gradual—for LGBT rights 
activism.22 Calling his interpretation of incrementalism a “law of small change,” 
Waaldijk’s study proposed a step-by-step approach to marriage equality through his 
substantially historical account of same-sex marriage developments in the 
Netherlands.23 Eskridge named his incrementalist theory, “equality practice,”24 and 
used it to justify favorably the enactment of civil unions, particularly in Vermont in 
1999 with Baker v. State.25 In slight contrast to Waaldijk and Eskridge, Merin’s 
position on incrementalism in his study was more heavily focused on its existence as 
an activist means to the process of achieving marriage equality, calling 
incrementalism a “necessary process,” which relays both descriptive and normative 
observations at the same time.26   
Although Waaldijk, Eskridge, and Merin each have slightly different takes on 
marriage equality incrementalism, their scholarship about marriage equality’s 
inevitability latch onto some common recognition of incrementalism as a vital 
                                                                                                                                            
 21 See Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 439-40; ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, 
at xiii-xiv; MERIN, supra note 17, at 308-09. 
 22 Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 440; ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, at xiii; 
MERIN, supra note 17, at 327. 
 23 Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 440. 
 24 ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, at xiii. 
 25 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 26 MERIN, supra note 17, at 327 (“The necessary process hypothesis is both descriptive 
and normative: it reflects how countries have actually moved toward the recognition of same-
sex partnerships, and it prescribes what has to take place in countries and states that have yet 
to provide comprehensive recognition to same-sex couples, such as the United States.”). 
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evolutionary staircase that will guide the movement toward that end. The notion of 
incrementalism runs deeper than supposing that merely time will change things. That 
evolutionary staircase with relatively specific steps escalates to progressively recast 
the visibility of sexual minorities upon the wide plain of civil legal rights in a 
society. By consensus, Eskridge, Merin, and Waaldijk all prescribe those steps in the 
following sequence: (1) the decriminalization of consensual same-sex intimacy 
occurs first; (2) then anti-discrimination against sexual minorities is furthered; and 
(3) lastly, the relationships of same-sex couples are then legally recognized.27 Once a 
state has crossed these three steps, the conditions for marriage equality will then be 
most evident. Subtle differences in Merin, Waaldijk, and Eskridge’s individual 
approaches exist alongside the broader similarities each has expressed in this same, 
three-step trajectory. For instance, unlike Eskridge and Merin, Waaldijk emphasizes 
that after the first step of decriminalizing sodomy, an adjustment to the age of 
consent follows.28 Meanwhile, Merin takes more expressly into account a possibility 
of a fourth step in Europe for parenting rights to flourish,29 and Eskridge 
idiosyncratically ties equality practice to communitarian and post-modern 
implications.30 Otherwise, all three scholars bear very similar incantations of a legal 
evolution toward marriage equality. Their differences might be in the variations of 
shape or color of the staircase steps, but not in the placement and order of the steps 
and in the final destination of same-sex marriage that these steps should reach. For 
its remainder, this Article, will refer to their strand of incrementalism 
interchangeably as the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory or marriage equality 
incrementalism.   
But what is more interesting is the broad commonality that Waaldijk, Eskridge, 
and Merin have each noted or characterized in between these steps. They each have 
observed the positive opportunity incrementalism affords to humanize the 
historically unpopular identities of sexual minorities.31 For Waaldijk, who wrote first 
about the particular steps that the Netherlands took to recognizing same-sex 
marriage, he pegged the process behind incrementalism as not just the recognition of 
same-sex marriage but rather “the legal recognition of homosexuality”—even though 
he is less forthcoming about the connection between recognition of sexual identity 
and same-sex marriage as he is concerned with detailing the three steps the 
Netherlands took to conferring marriage rights toward same-sex couples.32 Similarly, 
in explaining his “necessary process,” Merin acknowledges that “the fight for gays 
for inclusion in the institution of marriage should not be examined as an independent 
claim; rather, it should be assessed in light of the status of gay men and lesbians in 
Western societies in general and in fields of law other than marriage.”33 
                                                                                                                                            
 27 Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 439-40; ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 
xiii-xiv; see MERIN, supra note 17, at 308-09. 
 28 Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 440. 
 29 MERIN, supra note 17, at 327.  
 30 See generally ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 159-230. 
 31 Id. at xiii. 
 32 See generally Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 437-68.  
 33 MERIN, supra note 17, at 308. 
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Eskridge’s version appears most emotionally illustrative of this connection 
between incrementalism that results in marriage equality and societal acceptance of 
an undermined sexual identity. Within his “equality practice,” Eskridge dramatizes 
what he believes are the effects of incrementalism toward the social recognition of 
sexual minorities in tandem with the more immediate goal of furthering same-sex 
marriage:  
If you are sickened by “homosexuals,” you are unlikely to support gay 
marriage, but you might favor sodomy decriminalization for practical 
reasons, such as your belief that the state is wasting its time snooping 
around people’s bedrooms. Yet sodomy decriminalization and a lessoning 
of public condemnation of homosexuality will embolden some of your 
gay friends, family members, and coworkers to come out of their closets. 
You may be shocked at first, and you can assimilate them as exceptions to 
your dislike of homosexuals, but your antigay attitudes may soften as you 
enter middle age. Over time, your interaction with gay people might open 
you up to acquiescing in antidiscrimination laws, if your experience has 
been that gay coworkers are okay and that antigay workers are 
troublemakers. You could still oppose same-sex marriage, but even this 
attitude might bend when your daughter partners with another woman and 
your spouse and other children accept her and integrate her partner into 
the extended family. As each step in the progression toward gay equality 
encourages more people to be openly gay, not only can middle-aged 
homophobic attitudes change, but the attitudes of new generations might 
start out less homophobic. These changes will support gay equality.34 
Although Eskridge makes large, and at times, nearly tenuous, connective leaps 
between the steps of incrementalism in his illustration, the account that he draws is 
not impossible—that with each step, both the mainstream perceptions of sexual 
minorities and the self-identification of gay people will renegotiate to propitiate 
closer to acceptance and equality.35 Indeed Eskridge underlines this transformative 
notion by setting up the binary between what he calls, a “politics of recognition” and 
a “politics of preservation,” in regards to the mainstream reaction to sexual 
minorities as they become more visible within each step of incrementalism while the 
larger legal mechanism moves toward same-sex marriage.36 The trip made in 
equality practice is from, what he designates, a politics of preservation that retains 
the status quo of the institution of marriage to exclude same-sex couples toward a 
politics of recognition where sexual minorities have engaged in the process of social 
and legal recognition.37 In their respective ways, all three scholars suggest at the 
transformation of society’s acceptance and recognition of sexual minorities as the 
underlying result of incrementalism while, on the surface, incrementalism pushes 
onward to marriage equality.38 In the U.S., this change has been manifested within 
                                                                                                                                            
 34 ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 117. 
 35 Id. at 115. 
 36 Id. at 112. 
 37 Id. 
 38 See generally Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 437-68; ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, 
supra note 16, at 117; MERIN, supra note 17, at 308. 
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the last decade by gradual narratives that led to Windsor and how those narratives 
have altered the regulation of the identity expression of sexual minorities. Within the 
current U.S. narrative of marriage equality since Lawrence, incrementalism on the 
federal level has particularly involved the way that the law has handled the 
expression of identity for sexual minorities. Thusly, incrementalism not only 
provides the structural stairs for obtaining same-sex marriage, but as we will see, it 
also is a mechanism that has started to help strip away the marginalization of sexual 
minorities by pushing the law away from antigay essentialist approaches to sexual 
minorities. The result of de-marginalization explains why the incremental process 
requires certain steps to surpass before even the inevitability of marriage equality is 
possible.    
B. Dealing with Incrementalist Imprecision 
At the time of this writing, it has been more than a decade since the Eskridge-
Merin-Waaldijk theory came into scholarly view. Since 2002, when Merin and 
Eskridge published their works on incrementalism, sexual minorities have triumphed 
over a myriad of significant successes and setbacks in the path to gaining equality 
rights. For instance, in 2002, Lawrence had not overruled Bowers v. Hardwick39 and 
DOMA still restricted the federal definition of marriage for different-sex couples.40 
Merin and Eskridge’s respective 2002 studies came out a year before Massachusetts 
would usher in same-sex marriage with Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.41 
At that same time, Proposition 8 in California would have referred back to a 1982 
ballot measure titled Victim’s Bill of Rights that affected the state’s evidentiary code 
rather than a ballot measure redefining marriage between a man and a woman in the 
state constitution.42 Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell had not yet been repealed, and no support 
for same-sex marriage was imminent from the White House; and in fact, before 
President Obama would endorse gay rights or marriage equality as goals at his 
inaugurations43—not to mention broadcast his support for same-sex marriage on 
television44—there was, in contrast, congressional support for the Federal Marriage 
Amendment to keep marriage as only for different-sex couples.45 The catalysts that 
                                                                                                                                            
 39 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 40 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 
U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)). 
 41 See generally ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16. MERIN, supra note 17; 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 42 See Jeff Brown, Proposition 8: Origins and Impact—A Public Defender’s Perspective, 
23 PAC. L.J. 881 (1992). 
 43 David G. Savage, Inauguration 2013: Obama Hints at Greater Gay Marriage Support, 
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/21/news/la-pn-inauguration-
2013-obama-gay-marriage-support-20130121. 
 44 Jackie Calmes & Peter Baker, Obama Says Same-Sex Marriage Should Be Legal, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/us/politics/obama-says-same-sex-
marriage-should-be-legal.html?pagewanted=all. 
 45 Jonathan Turley, The American Gothic Amendment: Tinkering with the Constitution for 
the Wrong Reason, CHI. TRIB. (May 19, 2002), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-05-
19/news/0205190435_1_same-sex-marriages-marriage-act-marriage-matters. 
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prodded the Hollingsworth and Windsor cases seemed nascent. In 2002, the 
Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory in the U.S. was exactly what the name designates—
a theory. Since then, marriage equality incrementalism has been set into motion in 
the U.S. and some of the events above have directly tested that theory while others 
have shown their importance peripherally between the incremental steps. 
Critical voices have revisited the theory from time to time, mostly fixating on its 
tendency to generalize and also for its fit for the U.S. given our system of federalism 
where marriage is regulated by the states46 and the way marriage is viewed—often 
religiously—by the public.47 Indeed, post-2002, when applied to the marriage 
equality movement in the U.S., the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory seemed to be an 
imperfect theory—either not taking as much account of the nuances of the marriage 
equality movement through our system in which individual states regulate marriage, 
or appearing to focus on generalities rather than social conditions specific to the 
country or state that might affect the process. In light of recent acceleration in gay 
rights activism, the U.S. journey on the incrementalist path has some variation 
enough to pose revisions to the theory that account for the criticisms, but not a 
wholesale rejection. As discussed infra, such criticisms, though relevant, might have 
been premature because with Windsor, the theory’s applicability has actually been 
proven quite strongly. 
Specifically, step three of the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory—originally the 
legal recognition of same-sex couples through alternative relationship schemes, such 
as civil unions and partnerships—could now be broadened to encompass, not only 
those schemes, but also marriage itself, which possibly abridges the steps from three 
to two for some journeys. As discussed later, the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory 
can embrace its descriptive functions just as it has always done, but it take its 
normative functions less narrowly and restrictively. With that stated, the differences 
between the U.S. and elsewhere that had once seemed to reject the applicability of 
the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk incrementalism on American soil can be reconciled for 
a workable prediction of the inevitability of same-sex marriage in the U.S. In this 
manner, we can use incrementalism as a helpful guide to assist us in reaching 
marriage equality in fifty states, rather than using it as a mandated road that must be 
taken with exacting ritual.  
C. The Spirit Versus Letter Approach 
At its core, disjointed incrementalism—the broader process theory mechanism 
that houses the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory—assumes bounded rationality. 
Although it harbors long-term historical ties to Burkean notions of tradition and 
societal change,48 incrementalism as a recent economic, political science and policy 
                                                                                                                                            
 46 Erez Aloni, Incrementalism, Civil Unions, and the Possibility of Predicting Legal 
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 105, 135 (2010).  
 47 M. V. Lee Badgett, Predicting Partnership Rights: Applying the European Experience 
in the United States, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 71, 84-85 (2005). 
 48 See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Marriage as Monopoly: History, Tradition, Incrementalism, 
and the Marriage/Civil Union Distinction, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1397, 1408 (2009) (“Still another 
explanation for the history and tradition proffer might be an underlying commitment to a 
Burkean-style incrementalism, with the view that the risks associated with sharply altering 
tradition may outweigh the benefits of change.” (footnote omitted)). See generally Cass R. 
Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006). 
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decision-making theory is most closely linked to Yale economist, Charles Lindblom 
and his examinations on the process of gradual social changes that deviate minimally 
from status quo and how this type of transformation is more realistic than “synoptic” 
changes in which grand units of decision-making are accomplished in gestures that 
resemble “one fell swoop.”49 Incrementalism denotes gradual changes as more 
realistic, noting that “[w]hen a man sets out to solve a problem, he embarks on a 
course of mental activity more circuitous, more complex, more subtle, and perhaps 
more idiosyncratic than he perceives it”50 and that once “he is aware of some of the 
grosser aspects of his problem solving . . . he will often have only the feeblest insight 
into how his mind finds, creates, dredges up—which of these he does not know—a 
new idea.”51 In this way, Lindblom characterizes incrementalism as the product of 
bounded rationality: “Dodging in and out of the unconscious, moving back and forth 
from concrete to abstract, trying chance here and system there, soaring, jumping, 
backtracking, crawling, sometimes freezing on point like a bird dog, [the man] 
exploits mental process that are only slowly yielding to observation and systematic 
description.”52  
Applicable variously outside of the marriage equality movement, incrementalism 
has been subsequently “reframed” and summarized by other social science scholars 
to exhibit the following basic “stratagems”:53  
a. Limitation of analysis to a few somewhat familiar policy alternatives, 
of which one possible form is simple incremental analysis: 
consideration of alternative policies differing only marginally from the 
status quo;  
b. Intertwining of analysis of policy goals and other values with the 
empirical aspects of the problem—that is, no requirement that values 
be specified first with means subsequently found to promote them;  
c. Greater analytical preoccupation with ills to be remedied than positive 
goals to be sought;  
d. A sequence of trials, errors, and revised trials;  
e. Analysis that explores only some, not all, of the important possible 
consequences of a considered alternative;  
f. Fragmentation of analytical work to many partisan participants in 
policy making, each attending to their piece of the overall problem 
domain.54 
                                                                                                                                            
 49 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in 
the Administrate State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 72 (2010); Sharon 
B. Jacobs, Crises, Congress, and Cognitive Biases: A Critical Examination of Food and Drug 
Legislation in the United States, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 599, 625-26 (2009). 
 50 DAVID BRAYBROOKE & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION: POLICY 
EVALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 81 (1963). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Andrew Weiss & Edward Woodhouse, Reframing Incrementalism: A Constructive 
Response to the Critics, 25 POL’Y SCI. 255, 256 (1992). 
 54 Id. In its theoretical distillation, incrementalism—as it has been studied by others in the 
social sciences—has been a theory that embraces imperfections. Professors James Krier and 
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When applied to the marriage equality movement, the particular Eskridge-Merin-
Waaldijk theory of incrementalism embodies and exhibits the same kind of 
limitations that Lindblom’s theory prescribes. Indeed, at close glance, all of those six 
stratagems of Lindblom’s incrementalism appear in Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk’s 
more specified incrementalist theory for marriage equality. Without doubt, the term 
“incrementalism” was not misappropriated when Waaldijk, Eskridge, and Merin 
each used it to identify the possible steps it took for a society to achieve marriage 
equality.  
For instance, with the first stratagem—the limitations on policy alternatives—the 
journey from decriminalization of consensual same-sex intimacy to initiation of 
antidiscrimination policies covering sexual orientation, and finally to legal 
recognition of same-sex couples, can be thought of as a journey comprised of limited 
alternative policies differing marginally from one status quo to the next. In fact, 
when Waaldijk refers to his incrementalist theory as a “law of small change,” he 
fashions those small changes recognizing gay rights happening only “ ‘if that change 
is either perceived as small’ ”55 or alternatively “ ‘if that change is sufficiently 
reduced in impact by some accompanying legislative “small change” that reinforces 
the condemnation of homosexuality.’ ”56 Waaldijk cites examples of 
decriminalization of consensual same-sex intimacy in European countries where 
decriminalisation of sexual activity between adult men (and women) was 
accompanied by the maintenance or introduction of various specifically 
homosexual offences, including bans on homosexual activity “in public” 
(United Kingdom and Romania), or leading to “public scandal” (Bulgaria, 
Romania and formerly Spain), as well as on “proselytism” for it (Austria, 
Cyprus and Romania).57 
In describing “equality practice,” Eskridge notes that incrementalism “proceeds 
by little steps taken in a particular order”58 and that one of the imperfections in the 
gay rights movement in the U.S. and elsewhere is that the “law cannot move unless 
public opinion moves, but public attitudes can be influenced by changes in the 
                                                                                                                                            
Mark Brownstein, in writing about pollution control in environmental law, has commented 
that the widely-accepted Lindblom model of incrementalism considers “practical obstacles” 
part of the process of slow change and that “[f]ragmented institutions and segmented problem-
solving simply reflect the way reality shapes institutions and procedures. The world cannot be 
remade to fit the ambitions of comprehensive rationality; useful decision theory has to be 
tailored to the ugly imperfections of the real world.” James E. Krier & Mark Brownstein, On 
Integrated Pollution Control, 22 ENVTL. L. 119, 126 (1992). Lindblom himself had argued 
that humans are incapable of designing perfect systems because human rationality is 
inherently limited. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through”,19 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 79, 80 (1959). In this way, Lindblom explains that democracies “change their 
policies almost entirely through incremental adjustments. Policy does not move in leaps and 
bounds.” Id. at 84.  
 55 Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 440. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 441 n.18 (citations omitted). 
 58 ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 115. 
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law.”59 As such, “[f]or gay rights, the impasse suggested by this paradox can be 
ameliorated if the proponents of reform move step by step along a continuum of little 
reforms. Step-by-step permits gradual adjustment of antigay mindsets, slowly 
empowers gay rights advocates, and can discredit antigay arguments.”60 
Consequentially, this path is one that prefers a slow and steady pace.  
With the second stratagem that characterizes incrementalist motions as 
“intertwining of analysis of policy goals and other values with the empirical aspects 
of the problem,”61 economist Andrew Weiss and political scientist Edward J. 
Woodhouse, in defending Lindblom, explain further that this means there often is 
“no requirement that values be specified first with means subsequently found to 
promote them.”62 This stratagem could be signified by how—although the three 
events nearly required by the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory seek the surpassing of 
consensual same-sex intimacy laws, of discrimination against sexual minorities, and 
of legal recognition of same-sex couples—these events are not necessarily linked 
with the overall consequence of marriage equality in mind. Rather, each step can 
function—and does function—to achieve the de-marginalization of sexual 
minorities, but they are not informed by each other prior to each achievement. 
Despite the more nuanced readings of the Lawrence v. Texas majority (including 
Justice Scalia’s reading of it as expressed in his dissent) that claim that the Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion was a towering moment for the extension of marriage to same-
sex couples,63 the opinion itself in its then-present effect was narrower—only 
pertaining to invalidating laws that criminalized sexual minorities for engaging in 
consensual sodomy, and it was not facially evident that Kennedy penned the 
majority opinion with the goal of marriage equality; in fact, the majority demarcated 
the significance of its ruling by opining that the case “does not involve whether the 
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual 
persons seek to enter.”64 Instead, Kennedy wrote that “the case does involve two 
adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual 
practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect 
for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their 
destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”65 Although after the ruling, 
in scholarly and activist dissection, Lawrence does bear eventual incremental 
significance for the marriage equality movement, Lawrence itself was confined to 
existing as a due process case that decriminalized anti-sodomy laws and handed no 
precedent on equality of marriage for same-sex couples.66 This kind of self-
                                                                                                                                            
 59 Id. 
 60 Id.  
 61 Weiss & Woodhouse, supra note 53, at 256. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See Stephen Reinhardt, Legal & Political Perspectives on the Battle Over Same-Sex 
Marriage, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 11 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 64 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 65 Id. 
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containment in the increments likely demonstrates why Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk 
incrementalism embodies Lindblom’s idea of incrementalism because it does not 
explicitly harbor a means-ends momentum each time an increment is about to be 
met.    
The third stratagem in Lindblom’s incrementalist theory shows that the process 
of change harbors “[g]reater analytical preoccupation with ills to be remedied than 
positive goals sought.”67 The Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk incrementalism is rife with 
this attribute as well. For instance, in his “necessary process,” Merin describes this 
preoccupation after framing his incrementalist theory by starting with the 
discriminatory subordination of sexual minorities in the U.S. and abroad, both 
publicly and covertly.68 As a result, Merin articulates that the incremental process for 
sexual minorities to gain recognition of their relationships is an escalation towards 
greater tolerance that is embodied in his rendition of the three steps, couched from a 
remedial stance more so than an affirmative stance: “The first and basic level is to 
remove from the criminal code (if they exist) sanctions against homosexual and 
lesbian conduct; the second level is to prohibit discrimination against gay men and 
lesbians on the basis sexual orientation.”69 Merin describes both first and second 
steps from a perspective of removal and restriction: the law must take away the 
roadblocks that will prohibit future subordination of sexual minorities—in either 
steps, things must be “removed” or “prohibited” so that the marginalization is 
redressed. Only finally in incrementalism’s step three does Merin’s description seem 
a bit more positive when he describes that step as “affirmatively recogniz[ing] same-
sex partnerships as equal to opposite-sex unions for various purposes, beginning 
with ‘soft’ rights such as various economic benefits and following that step with 
comprehensive recognition of same-sex partnerships.”70  
The fourth stratagem involving incrementalism as “[a] sequential of trials, errors, 
and revised trials” could be envisioned again by Waaldijk’s description that in his 
“law of small changes,” where “each step in this standard sequence is in fact a 
sequence in itself.”71 Again, the U.S. example of decriminalization of consensual 
                                                                                                                                            
 66 See Anthony Michael Kreis, Gay Gentrification: Whitewashed Fictions of LGBT 
Privilege and the New Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 31 LAW & INEQ. 117, 146-47 (“While 
the decisions in both Bowers and Lawrence turned on the issue of a constitutional right to 
homosexual sodomy, it is clear from the briefs and oral argument that the Justices were much 
more informed (and presumably mindful) of the decision's potential impact on related matters 
embedded in family law. Indeed, Justice Kennedy took great care to distance Lawrence from 
the fomenting marriage equality debate.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
578 (opining that the majority decision in Lawrence “does not involve whether the 
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to 
enter”). 
 67 Weiss & Woodhouse, supra note 53, at 256. 
 68 MERIN, supra note 17, at 308. Merin notes that “in many countries, including most U.S. 
states, gays do not enjoy the protection of antidiscrimination laws,” and that “[n]ot only are 
gay men and lesbians not legally protected from discrimination, but, to varying degrees and 
depending on the country, the vast majority of the legal systems of the Western world still 
covertly discriminate against them.” Id. 
 69 Id. at 309. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 440. 
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same-sex intimacy in Lawrence serves demonstratively. Although the Supreme 
Court did not invalidate anti-sodomy laws until 2003 with Lawrence, the entire 
process of decriminalization is likely to have involved Bowers v. Hardwick72 nearly 
two decades before, with the first Supreme Court litigation over anti-sodomy laws in 
Georgia. That first attempt failed to bring about decriminalization of anti-sodomy 
laws, and 17 years passed before the issue was again heard at the Supreme Court-
level.73 In the interim, the Court ruled favorably for gay rights in Romer v. Evans,74 
which overturned an amendment to Colorado’s constitution that prohibited any 
governmental anti-discriminatory legislation protecting sexual minorities.75 The 
Court had invalidated that amendment after an enhanced rational basis analysis 
found animus behind the amendment.76 When the issue of anti-sodomy laws circled 
back to the Court in Lawrence, Romer was used, in conjunction with Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,77 which had also been ruled upon between 
Bowers and Lawrence in order to create a “serious erosion”78 of the “foundations of 
Bowers.”79 This nearly two decade span between first and second litigations at the 
Supreme Court that resulted eventually with the first step in the Eskridge-Merin-
Waaldijk incrementalism did not come about through one complete gesture, rather 
even a quick glance reveals that this increment resulted from an evolving process of 
its own, that redefined the issues that finally brought forth change.80 
The fifth noted stratagem of incrementalism reflects how the process contains 
“analysis that explores only some, not all, of the important possible consequences of 
a considered alternative.”81 This particular stratagem is mirrored in the way that the 
original Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk incrementalist theory all found at the time that the 
legal recognition of same-sex relationship—the last step—only included the 
possibility of same-sex couples being legally recognized in categories alternative to 
marriage, such as civil unions and/or partnerships. Waaldijk’s version of legal 
recognition includes only parenting and same-sex partnerships82; while Eskridge 
                                                                                                                                            
 72 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 73 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 74 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 75 Id. at 635-36. 
 76 See id. at 632-36. 
 77 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). 
 78 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 
109 (2003) (“That is to say, Romer called into question the premise articulated in that opinion 
that the mere fact of majoritarian disapproval of homosexuality is a sufficient warrant for 
legislation disadvantaging homosexuals. Even now it seems to me that gays, lesbians, and 
bisexuals can more directly claim protections from adverse governmental consideration of 
their orientation in employment, family, and housing decisions by invoking Romer.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 81 Weiss & Woodhouse, supra note 53, at 256. 
 82 Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 440. 
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mentions the same about partnerships but also overwhelmingly fits civil unions and 
reciprocal beneficiaries into the fray83; and Merin shares broad similarities with 
Eskridge by describing his step three as comprising registered partnerships and civil 
unions.84 At the time of their original theorizing, when the incidents of marriage 
equality internationally was thinner than what it is presently, and the visibility of 
sexual minorities and their entitlement to equality had not escalated into 
consciousness with the kind of acceptance today, legal recognition of same-sex 
couples through partnerships, civil unions, and other forms short of marriage was 
likely more tenable compared to the option of actual marriage itself. Though 
marriage was itself a possible legal recognition of same-sex couples because it 
existed as the ultimate legal recognition of personal relationships, it was likely not as 
probable for sexual minorities at the time Eskridge, Merin, and Waaldijk 
promulgated their incrementalist theory. And although the possibility of bypassing 
these alternative forms of legally-recognized relationships for marriage itself would 
be much more possible if a state had already achieved the second incrementalist 
step—antidiscriminatory legislation based on sexual orientation—Eskridge, Merin, 
and Waaldijk all chose to exclude it from the list of possible ways of legally 
recognizing same-sex couples in order to fulfill this third and last increment of their 
theory. And as we will see, such acceleration of LGBT rights and visibility since 
then implies changes in this list of alternatives. 
Finally, the last stratagem which allows the process to break the “analytical work 
to many partisan participants in policy-making, each attending to their piece of the 
overall problem domain”85 can be inferred by the complexity and studied in avenue 
of ways in which each of the increments could be resolved. For instance, 
decriminalization of consensual same-sex intimacy could be achieved either through 
a majoritarian body—which is how Waaldijk has described the way many European 
countries did away with their anti-sodomy laws86—or through counter-majoritarian 
measures such as in Lawrence, where the Supreme Court overturned the Texas 
statute against consensual sodomy.87 Within either situation the partisanship would 
exist, even thinly, as the decision to decriminalize becomes part of the decision-
making. In Lawrence, the ruling to invalidate anti-sodomy laws was a result of a 
majority vote on the Court of 6-3 between liberal and conservative justices.88 In the 
marriage equality struggle in California, that increment involved judicial review by 
the California State Supreme Court in In Re Marriage Cases that rendered same-sex 
marriage legal in 2008.89 Then a public ballot measure, Proposition 8, followed that 
consequently revoked the future ability of same-sex couples to marry.90 Further 
                                                                                                                                            
 83 ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, at xiv. 
 84 MERIN, supra note 17, at 333. 
 85 Weiss & Woodhouse, supra note 53, at 256. 
 86 Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 440. 
 87 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003). 
 88 See id. 
 89 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 90 Dan Morain & Jessica Garrison, Gay Marriage Timeline: Focused Beyond Marriage, 
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-timelinegaymarriage-
2008nov06,0,496938.story#axzz2onYMEnjD. 
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resolution in the courts ensued—this time federal—with a final opinion by the 
Supreme Court in Hollingsworth v. Perry.91 Each step along the way had its own 
actors—from judges to voters to litigants and finally to the panel of Supreme Court 
Justices. 
The above-demonstration shows that the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk 
incrementalism does fit within the signature of Lindblom’s classical theory of 
incrementalism. This analysis is not merely helpful in showing that the Eskridge-
Merin-Waaldijk theory exists as a variant of Lindblom’s examined theory of change, 
but it rather observes what kind of studied attributes that such a theory would 
evidently hold. In this way, knowing these attributes—or stratagems—allows more 
functional critiques of the theory when the three incremental steps are applied to 
same-sex marriage in the U.S.—whether the movement is really filled with small 
changes, whether it gets us to practice equality, whether some of the steps in the 
process are really necessary. Again, because of incrementalism’s implicit 
entanglement with bounded rationality, academic defenders of Lindblom, such as 
Andrew Weiss and Edward Woodhouse, have noted a general misunderstanding that 
arises when others study a particular transformation along an incrementalist path; 
they are impatient with it—perhaps by a sheer human incapability to understand the 
theory because they overlook bounded rationality: 
[T]he misunderstandings arise partly because incrementalism runs against 
the grain of fundamental precepts in Western culture. Especially among 
students of policy making there remains an excessive faith in the 
possibility of conducting politics largely via systematic professional 
analysis, and Lindblom’s debunking of this notion may have seemed to 
challenge noble aspirations of using government for social justice, 
environmental protection, and other progressive purposes.92  
These misunderstandings, according to Weiss and Woodhouse specifically, have 
often led scholars, who are both critics and supporters of the theory, astray.93 The 
tension, as Weiss and Woodhouse seem to imply when they propose to address this 
problem with misunderstanding, is with normative uses of the theory, and how 
critics of the theory perhaps become too involved with the specific details: “A 
possible tack in this direction is to go back to the spirit rather than the letter of 
Lindblom’s work, getting away from unproductive debates over secondary issues 
like small steps and inviting a reopening of the underlying inquiry.”94 Weiss and 
Woodhouse suggest the negotiation between descriptive and normative approaches 
of incrementalism generally use the descriptive approach in broad strokes to inform 
the normative approach so that one reflects towards the underlying spirit rather than 
                                                                                                                                            
 91 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 92 Weiss & Woodhouse, supra note 53, at 267.  
 93 Id. at 267 (“One possibility is simply to say that the critics are wrong and let it go at 
that. But the fact that some very good scholars have been put off by one or more aspects of the 
concept as they understand it, and the original formulation of incrementalist ideas (particularly 
the discussion of small steps) probably contributed to the misunderstanding. As important, 
even the advocates are making little progress developing the incrementalist tradition.”).  
 94 Id. (emphasis added). 
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letter of incrementalist movements in order to then pose questions normatively.95 In 
this way, their defense about the utility of incrementalism highlights not its 
predictive nature of things but what incrementalism can tell us about effective 
strategies:  
How do individuals, organizations, and societies cope with limits on human 
understanding, and how can they do it better as so to improve policy making? If 
condemned by lack of time, resources, and cognitive power to proceeding with 
inadequate understanding, how can we become better incrementalists or better 
strategic thinkers and actors more generally? What strategies, institutions, and 
processes would be helpful in promoting the improved use of strategic analysis and 
action through social life?96 
This kind of study can be gaze appropriately upon the incrementalism 
behind marriage equality. Instead of its predictive value about the 
inevitability of marriage equality, the normative uses of the Eskridge-
Merin-Waaldijk incrementalism lies in strategy and choices to make as 
the incremental steps has the ability to take us closer and closer to a 
common goal. This approach, to look more for the broad strategies rather 
than the predictive nature of incrementalism, might assist those 
investigating the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory and importing lessons 
learned from comparative versions internationally into obtaining marriage 
equality in the U.S. Chiefly, this observation about incrementalism would 
seem to temper voices critical of the theory, which could place previous 
criticisms of the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory into question as critics 
have highlighted the theory’s predictive nature and rejected the theory 
based on such over-reliance on the “letter” of the theory rather than the 
“spirit.”97  
As Lindblom himself also notes about incrementalism in his original, exegetical 
work on the theory in general, the mechanisms in this type of slow change embodies 
a certain deceptive flexibility:  
The series of analyses and evaluations that typically characterize problem solving 
in the field of public policy is not always a tidy series, not always explicitly 
identified as a series, not always recognized as a series. Sometimes frames of 
reference shift in the course of series, in some cases so much so that new steps take 
on the superficial appearance of an entirely new line of problem solving. But this 
appearance should not obscure the continuity that often exists below the level of 
superficial observation.98 
Lindblom seems to suggest that no matter how disjointed or obscure the 
particular series of transformative negotiations that embody an increment appears, 
                                                                                                                                            
 95 Id. at 267. 
 96 Id. at 267-68. 
 97 See Aloni, supra note 46, at 160 (“More troubling is the suggestion that the process of 
achieving legal recognition of same-sex marriage can be definable[.]”); see also Badgett, 
supra note 47, at 75 (“Many historians of sexuality note that historical ‘progress’ in tolerance 
of homosexuality is not linear. . . . Not surprisingly, the incrementalists offer no clear idea 
about how long each incremental step should or will take.”).  
 98 BRAYBROOKE & LINDBLOM, supra note 50, at 100-01. 
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the underlying continuity inhabits a bigger, unifying picture, with unifying themes. 
He illustrates this idea about incrementalism with the following example:  
[A] shift in congressional attention from income-tax legislation to sales-
tax legislation might reflect a continuing concern and a serial attack on 
certain problems of income distribution. Shifts in attention from 
controversy over large aircraft carriers versus bombers to a missile 
program to public policy on basic research to federal aid to education 
should not obscure an underlying continuity of interest in national 
security—even though the consideration of federal aid to education 
requires attention to many issues other than national security.99  
This flexibility inextricably plays into the sequential trial-and-error stratagem 
illustrated by the way the Supreme Court decriminalized sodomy—notably trial-and-
error first with Bowers, and then success later with Lawrence.100 But flexibility is 
also pertinent to marriage equality incrementalism more broadly as it would possibly 
allow for revision of the letter—or letters—within the spirit of the Eskridge-Merin-
Waaldijk theory to reflect idiosyncrasies in the U.S. version and the refinement of 
strategies that reflects such idiosyncrasies—not to mention, address its critics.  
D. Revising Step Three 
With spirit and flexibility noted, one example of using the spirit-versus-letter 
approach reconciles the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory with both Erez Aloni’s 
major criticism of the theory’s exclusive reliance on civil unions and marriage-like 
classifications for step three’s legal recognition of same-sex relationships, and M.V. 
Lee Badgett’s criticism that the three steps do not heavily account for the socio-
political climate of the U.S., but promotes the path in a general, nearly all-too 
universalist way.101 Together, however, Aloni and Badgett’s observations can be 
conflated in a way that assists in refining marriage equality incrementalism in the 
U.S., and reflect the transitioning political climate and the public fervor for same-sex 
marriage presently. 
When the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory was first observed and disseminated, 
the justification for marriage alternatives, such as civil unions and partnerships—
these other forms of recognizing intimate relationships—was progress because it 
gave rights to same-sex couples that they had not received before.102 This 
justification was important because these types of recognition short of marriage and 
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 100 Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (“[T]o claim that a right to 
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conferring of rights and benefits previously unavailable to same-sex couples were 
necessary for fulfilling the kind of legal recognition of same-sex relationships that 
step three required to further the progression eventually toward marriage equality; as 
Merin notes, “[b]efore same-sex marriage becomes possible, the final step of the 
necessary process must be completed, namely, broad recognition in the form of 
registered partnership or civil union[.]”103 At the time, part of this recognition’s 
importance as a pre-requisite for marriage equality depended on the changed 
perceptions of same-sex couples after obtaining this recognition for their 
relationships. Eskridge’s step-by-step approach relies partly on the paradox that the 
“law cannot move unless public opinion moves, but public attitudes can be 
influenced by changes in the law.”104 From here, Eskridge’s hope with Vermont’s 
civil unions—and with civil unions largely—was that “[t]heories of prejudice 
suggest how Vermont’s newest move, same-sex unions, will contribute to the 
rational and tolerant society of that state in a way that anti-discrimination laws do 
not.”105 He acknowledged that “[i]n important respects, the civil union law is 
inconsistent with the premises of the liberal state as applied to same-sex couples: it 
treats them differently from different-sex couples, and for reasons that are hard to 
justify without resort to arguments grounded in state denigration or even 
prejudices.”106 However, in an underlying fashion, these alternative types of legal 
recognition amount to an avoidance of bigger ills, leading us to a place where 
“functionally, the law ameliorates, rather than ratifies, a sexuality caste system.”107 
Eskridge’s premise, then, held some truth because prior to these alternative types of 
relationships, same-sex couples did not have the legal spotlight upon them in a way 
that conferred rights that were closer to the neighborhood of marriage rather than the 
neighborhood of invisibility—or worse, the neighborhood of social and legal 
contempt.108 With utopian flare, Eskridge noted, in respect to Vermont in 2000, that 
the civil union system there “is one where liberal values of rationality, mutual 
respect, and tolerance among gay and straight people can flourish.”109 
More than a decade has passed, and the question now is whether public opinion 
stands similarly today as when Eskridge made his observations about Vermont’s 
civil unions. This question shows that Aloni and Badgett are right that comparative 
models of marriage equality might not be as helpful for the U.S. as previously 
                                                                                                                                            
 103 MERIN, supra note 17, at 333; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Comparative Law and 
the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: A Step-by-Step Approach Toward State Recognition, 31 
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 104 Eskridge, Comparative Law, supra note 103, at 648.  
 105 Eskridge, Liberal Reflections, supra note 102, at 870. 
 106 Id. at 854. 
 107 Id. at 864. 
 108 See, e.g., Eskridge, Liberal Reflections, supra note 102, at 865-866 (“Following [Baker 
v. State], the civil unions law gives civil-unioned partners a variety of state-supported rights 
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conceived because the “letter” itself—the details—in step three could be changed to 
reflect the transformations on the national imagination and marriage equality 
movements since the early 2000s.110 This kind of revisionist enquiry is part of the 
flexibility Lindblom and his defenders conceptually prescribed. And the possible 
way to reconcile this attribute of incrementalism and the development and 
idiosyncrasies of the U.S. in marriage equality is to use them to expand what could 
belong in step three’s legal recognition of same-sex couples.  
First, since Eskridge and Merin separately wrote about incrementalism in 2002 to 
the time of this writing, eighteen states (California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington), and the District of Columbia have 
extended marriage to same-sex couples.111 As far as idiosyncrasies that distance the 
U.S. from other countries, our system of federalism recognizes that marriage in the 
U.S. is not directly regulated by the federal government, but by individual states.112 
Although Eskridge and Merin do both acknowledge the federal and state players 
when they describe the U.S. journey113 and both Aloni and Badgett’s scholarly 
criticisms indirectly exhibit the concept of federalism,114 Jane Schacter’s recent 
specific emphasis on the states—specifically calling it “patchwork” or “federalist” 
incrementalism—draws this notion out that there might be two major categorical 
journeys of incrementalism on American soil: one, federally, and the other, 
collectively through the patchwork of states, which presumably consist of 50 mini-
journeys.115 It is not just once that the U.S. has to journey through the three steps of 
the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory for marriage equality, but the journey plays out 
on the federal level and concurrently through a patchwork of states until that 
patchwork is obliterated by all 50 states recognizing same-sex marriage.116 Since 
Merin’s work, which was the latest scholarship on incrementalism, the U.S. has been 
moving steadily toward positive notions regarding the rights of sexual minorities. 
The patchwork of more than one-fourth of the states in the Union recognizing same-
sex marriages reflects changing attitudes in this fashion. Particularly prescient since 
President Obama’s support of marriage equality, the number of political figures and 
institutions changing views and backing same-sex couples in receiving marriage 
rights has grown quickly—including changes in attitude of politically conservative 
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groups and individuals.117 Socially, public opinion has switched from condemning 
same-sex marriage to much more support in the last decade.118  
In Lindblom’s incrementalism, these changes would suggest significant impact 
on the “letters” of marriage equality incrementalism that should fine-tune the journey 
in the U.S. to ultimately capture the “spirit” of the incremental shift. In addition, the 
existence of same-sex marriage in the “patchwork” states, the visibility of same-sex 
couples in those states who are recognized under those laws, and the changing 
support for marriage equality could be tipping the balance in the legal recognition of 
same-sex relationships toward marriage equality itself directly, rather than marriage-
like alternatives first and then marriage equality secondly. This notion might be even 
furthered if several of those patchwork states reached marriage equality from anti-
discrimination laws that included sexual orientation (step two), and had bypassed 
legally recognizing same-sex relationship through civil unions or partnerships (step 
three). Indeed, such “outliers,” as Iowa, Minnesota, and New York, in the 
patchwork—that did achieve marriage equality rights without crossing the step that 
required civil unions or partnerships—and would support the notion that the 
inevitability of marriage equality in a particular state might allow for jumping over 
civil unions to dash to the marriage alter itself.119 Just as Aloni is right that there are 
variations on how to get to same-sex marriage,120 so is this phenomenon playing 
right into the revisionist stratagems of Lindblom’s observations generally about 
incrementalism.  
Secondly, the relevance of civil unions and partnerships have been placed into 
question by the potential “separate but equal” stigma of these alternative marriage-
like schemes. Douglas NeJaime recently tracked the transition showing how civil 
unions, in particular, were once celebrated and then later vilified in the marriage 
equality movement.121 At first, “[a]dvocates framed civil unions, which provided 
same-sex couples with the state-based rights and benefits of marriage, as a measure 
that achieved equality.”122 But even as early as 2003, when litigation over Goodridge 
was in full swing, NeJaime describes how pro-gay lawyers in Baker v. State now 
involved in Goodridge had the opportunity to “frame the Vermont experience as one 
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that produced inequality and continued discrimination.”123 Then even later in 2006, 
with Massachusetts as the only state with marriage equality and New Jersey about to 
follow Vermont by installing civil unions, “LGBT rights advocates protested,”124 
and deliberately challenged civil union’s relevance by pointing out that civil unions 
could easily lead to second-class citizenry.125 NeJaime observed that the LGBT 
rights lawyers in Vermont and Massachusetts knew what they were doing when they 
advocated for civil unions first and then abandoned it when marriage equality 
seemed more salient.126 Their calculating shift hinged upon the rise of marriage 
equality in particular over alternative types of marriage-like recognition and 
connotes an expiration of the functional significance of civil unions “as a temporary 
solution.”127    
At the same time, Elizabeth Glazer has posited the gaining complexity with civil 
unions in part because such legal recognition of same-sex couples do sustain that 
visibility that Eskridge, Merin, and Waaldijk previously urged as the important, step-
three jumping-off point before marriage equality.128 Glazer writes that civil unions 
present an interesting slippage that adds to the same-sex marriage debate, 
“highlight[ing] that it is not only the liberty interest of not being forced to assimilate 
that is essential for the LGBT rights movement but also the equality interest of not 
being treated differently from couples whose members are of different sexes.”129 
According to Zachary Kramer, “[t]he point is that the marriage equality movement 
needs to keep an open mind when it comes to proposed marriage reforms. Marriage 
is a continually evolving social practice, and marriage law evolves alongside it, 
sometimes as the catalyst for change, other times in response to a change in social 
practice.”130 This kind of negotiation is what incrementalism can afford sequentially.  
If there are some states or journeys in the incrementalist path for which marriage 
equality is the natural leap from anti-discrimination that includes sexual orientation 
and others that approach this journey more thoughtfully about civil unions and find 
some relevance for alternative legal recognitions of same-sex couples short of 
marriage, then step three in Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory could be enlarged to 
include same-sex marriage as another option. Of course, this change would abridge 
step three for those states that reach for it, rather than installing an alternative 
scheme. Nonetheless, despite the substantial trend of states that customarily follow 
the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk path of adopting an alternative scheme first and then 
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fulfilling step three before adopting same-sex marriage, the small minority of outlier 
states that bypassed this step and successfully obtained marriage equality (Iowa, 
Minnesota, and New York) would support that option as a viable one for future pro-
marriage equality states popping up within the patchwork. This shortcut might 
possibly be consistent with the need, relevance, and significance of alternative 
relationship recognition when the opinion of same-sex relationships and sexual 
minorities have changed since Eskridge, Merin, and Waaldijk first introduced the 
theory. What Eskridge and Merin might have considered a necessary increment, 
because of the “newness” of legally recognizing same-sex couples, has now been 
weakened due to the positive visibility of same-sex couples in the law since the early 
2000s, or the rise of same-sex marriage in individual states since Massachusetts. 
Here is where Schacter’s patchwork incrementalism might also have a similar effect 
toward remodeling that third step in the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk incrementalism. If 
states like Iowa, Minnesota, and New York, that were at step two with some 
antidiscrimination laws covering sexual minorities, continue to move toward 
marriage equality before adopting civil unions or partnerships, adding marriage 
equality into step three—essentially doing away with that last step altogether—
would be a tenable revision of incrementalism, created by its own progress. Here in 
lies flexibility. 
In sum, to tease out the normative uses of the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory, 
the key, according to scholars who have defended Lindblom’s incrementalism is to 
funnel incrementalism’s general predictive worth toward anticipating what the next 
step will be, rather than anticipating when marriage equality will happen. Flexibility 
and intelligent trial-and-error exist as attributes of Lindblom’s incremental decision 
theory and should prompt adjustment and re-adjustment along the “spirit” of the 
marriage equality movement and not its “letters.” In this way, a revision to step three 
is suggested to include a “side-step” option for legally recognizing same-sex couples 
through marriage itself—thus, for some journeys, collapsing the third original step of 
the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory. Doing so would hopefully reconcile critical 
concerns over straight-jacketing the U.S. to the letter of Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk 
incrementalism and not account for social and political differences that pose 
significance. 
Lastly, the final descriptive insight that avails itself for normative strategy is 
related to this Article’s main premise and the focal discussion in Part III, which is 
that the underlying continuity beneath the marriage equality incrementalism the U.S. 
has taken federally has all involved de-regulating the expression of sexual identities 
as a reflection of how the law has destabilized the traditional use of antigay 
essentialism. Particularly with DOMA’s partial invalidation in Windsor, Part IV will 
then evaluate this transition normatively for its merit as a strategy posed by the U.S. 
variation of the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory with the rise of animus-focused 
jurisprudence. Such enquiry so far—and those remaining—in this Article has been 
conducted within the spirit of Lindblom’s incrementalism with the hopes of striving 
to become better incrementalists when it comes to marriage equality’s trajectory in 
the U.S.  
III. IDENTITY EXPRESSION AND THE FEDERAL JOURNEY OF THE ESKRIDGE-MERIN-
WAALDIJK INCREMENTALISM 
The U.S. variation of marriage equality incrementalism, as theorized by 
Eskridge, Merin, and Waaldijk, has moved the law away from an antigay essentialist 
approach that has harmed the social visibility of sexual minorities. From Lawrence 
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to Windsor, Part III explores why and how the steps that animate the Eskridge-
Merin-Waaldijk theory have substantially occurred federally. 
A. Decriminalization of Same-Sex Intimacy in Lawrence v. Texas 
By itself, Lawrence v. Texas imparted much momentum for sexual minorities by 
overruling its previous affirmation and tolerance of anti-sodomy laws in Bowers.131 
The issue’s high visibility and the Court’s determination to revisit and decriminalize 
conduct possibly indicative of a sexual identity have been discussed at length as an 
immense event for sexual minorities.132 It was also the clearest indication of reaching 
step one in the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory.  
However, even as step one, Lawrence was itself too the product of 
incrementalism. According to Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, what led to the 
Court’s post-Bowers enquiry into anti-sodomy laws was a societal evolution of the 
sodomy issue toward sexual minorities after 1986, coupled with two important 
decisions in privacy and anti-discrimination that came forth during that same time.133 
Kennedy noted that “the deficiencies in Bowers became even more apparent in the 
years following its announcement”134 and summarized the decline in the number of 
states who still criminalized sodomy (from 25 states to the 13 at the time) and how 
many of those declining states failed to execute their sodomy statutes by adopting “a 
pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in private.”135 
The two post-Bowers cases Kennedy mentioned were Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,136 and Romer v. Evans.137 Kennedy characterized Casey 
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as having “confirmed that our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to 
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, child rearing, and education,”138 and that Casey’s pronouncement here 
for an individual’s autonomy for making such decisions was inconsistent with 
Bowers.139 Specifically, under Casey but not Bowers, “[p]ersons in a homosexual 
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons 
do.”140 From Romer, Kennedy imported the spirit of anti-discrimination from that 
case’s ruling on Amendment 2 to Colorado’s Constitution, which had broadly 
singled out homosexuals and denied them protection under the state’s laws.141 
Kennedy in Lawrence was aided by how Romer was unsympathetic under an 
enhanced rationality review of a law created by animus toward a particular group.142  
Yet, the intersection between privacy and anti-discrimination was not just a facial 
justification for the Lawrence Court to raise issue with the Texas sodomy law and 
then decriminalize its prohibited conduct. Framing the decision within existing legal 
dialogue in private autonomy and anti-discrimination set the opinion up for focusing 
on how the criminalization of sexual conduct infringed not just upon the rights of 
consenting adults but also how the law restricted the way in which sexual minorities 
expressed their identities. This is one of the symbolic reaches of Lawrence.  
1. Bowers’ Anti-Gay Essentialism 
By dealing with identity expression, Lawrence had to comment on the antigay 
essentialism apparent in Bowers. Little difficulty now exists in seeing how Bowers 
treated homosexuality as inferior by criminalizing the way the law believed this 
particular identity and orientation essentially manifested: through same-sex 
intimacy.143 The significance of labeling sex acts comes into focus as Justice White’s 
narrowing of the issue in Bowers—which could have focused on sodomy as a 
practice generally since the Georgia law did not differentiate between different-sex 
and same-sex partners—to “homosexual sodomy” immediately created a 
categorization based on biology as “homosexual sodomy” would imply a host of 
other sex acts not under scrutiny, including inter alia, “heterosexual sodomy” and, of 
course, heterosexual penile-vaginal intercourse.144 This implication drew itself out 
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quite early in Bowers when Justice White examined case law dealing with privacy, 
marriage, and reproductive rights, and failed to recognize that the rights from such 
case law “bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals 
to engaged in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case.” 145 White also found “[n]o 
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and 
homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated, either by the Court of 
Appeals or by respondent.”146 Biology was at the center of Bowers’ distancing of 
homosexual sodomy from other sex acts—or at least White’s nitpicking fixation on 
differences and his attempt to isolate, based mainly on arguing that acts between 
consenting same-sex parties bore no apparent likeness to acts that were mainstream 
or procreative, or acts that were previously the subject of the Court’s preoccupation 
in other cases.147 That biological difference was drawn by the catalogue of criminal 
anti-sodomy laws and historical references that White conjured to show how 
“[p]roscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots,”148 and bolster his 
characterization of that history of disapproval, and arguably animus.149 From 
biology, differentiation, and animus, the Bowers majority then fashioned its position 
to marginalize homosexual sodomy and, in turn, upheld the Georgia to regulate sex 
in this way.150 That reasoning also led to the reluctance of the Court later in the 
opinion “to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new 
fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause” that would otherwise 
recognize homosexual sodomy.151  
Bowers, of course, did not stop sexual minorities from engaging in consensual 
intimacy. Partly, the desuetude that some states exhibited in non-enforcement 
bolsters this assumption.152 However, Bowers rendered a value judgment that then 
justified the law to hold “homosexual sodomy”—and perhaps by extension, other 
same-sex acts and practices—as naturally criminal.153 The implications for identity 
expression and social visibility would be that when sexual minorities would 
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“practice” their orientation through sex acts, they would be rendered criminal. 
Figuratively, this result was the storm that gathered over sexual minorities for the 
next 17 years. The law, under Bowers, could metonymically harness the biological 
differences within sex acts between homosexual and heterosexual categories and 
then categorize one such group of acts as criminal in order to facilitate such criminal 
branding of sexual minorities. That metonymy was problematic as it underscored 
narrow assumptions about sodomy practices and sexual orientation that considered 
sex acts as nearly accurate indicators of orientation and excluded possibilities of 
sexual identity as something perhaps more fluid.154 At its crux, the Court’s reliance 
on biology produced an antigay essentialism that attempted to capture the 
homosexual who practiced an act that might be indicative of orientation.  
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Bowers found the majority’s construence of 
“homosexual sodomy” too narrow and problematic.155 In addition to finding that 
privacy law would allow sodomy practices to be constitutionally protected, 
Blackmun also found that the majority’s narrowing of the issue down to whether a 
fundamental right to homosexual sodomy existed ignored how the Georgia law 
could have also applied to sodomy between heterosexuals, which underlines the 
majority’s attempt to regulate the identity expression of sexual minorities to reflect 
disapproval of the group.156 Blackmun’s dissent also combated some of the 
biological assumptions that could lead to antigay essentialist approaches and suggest 
more debatable fluidity within the definition of sexual identity beyond sex acts than 
the majority had let on.157 For instance, the importance of biology was de-
emphasized and some semblance of construction was built over the majority’s 
essentialism when Blackmun wrote that “[d]espite historical views of 
homosexuality, it is no longer viewed by mental health professionals as a ‘disease’ 
or disorder [by the American Psychological Association]. But obviously, neither is it 
simply a matter of deliberate personal election. Homosexual orientation may well 
form part of the very fiber of an individual’s personality.”158 Whatever that 
definition of sexual identity may be—biology or choice, nature versus nurture, 
essentialism or construct—it seemed to Blackmun that this fluidity fit centrally into 
why a broader view of the Georgia statute was more appropriate than what the 
majority utilized because that fluidity manifests in one way in which individuals 
define themselves, through intimacy: “The fact that individuals define themselves in 
a significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with others suggest, in a 
Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be ‘right’ ways of conducting those 
relationships and that much of the richness of a relationship will come from the 
freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal 
bonds.”159 Blackmun opined broadly, applying this observation across orientations, 
                                                                                                                                            
 154 See Francisco Valdes, Sexual Minorities in the Military: Charting the Constitutional 
Frontiers of Status and Conduct, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 381, 450-56 (1994) (discussing 
“sodomy-as-fiction” stereotyping of gays). 
 155 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
 156 Id. at 201.  
 157 Id. at 205.  
 158 Id. at 202 n.2. 
 159 Id. at 205. 
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focusing on commonalities and writing, not between “homosexuals” and 
“heterosexuals,” but writing about “individuals.”160 Notably and interestingly, 
Blackmun challenged the majority’s essentialism by questioning the problematic 
criminalization of homosexual sodomy based on a heavy-handed reliance on biology 
that, in his view, led to a terse justification for anti-sodomy laws.161 Instead of 
biological and essentialist comparisons between homosexual and heterosexual sex, 
Blackmun—in a very Millian tone—would have outlawed sex acts based on those 
that harmed others over those that would not:  
[I]t does seem to me that a court could find simple, analytically sound 
distinctions between certain private, consensual sexual conduct, on the 
one hand, and adultery and incest (the only two vaguely specific “sexual 
crimes” to which the majority points, ante, at 2846), on the other. . . . 
Notably, the Court makes no effort to explain why it has chosen to group 
private, consensual homosexual activity with adultery and incest rather 
than with private, consensual heterosexual activity by unmarried persons 
or, indeed, with oral or anal sex within marriage.162 
In this way, Blackmun found reason here that the Bowers majority interfered 
with an individual’s right to determine one’s identity by artificially (and irrationally) 
overemphasizing the biological differences between heterosexual and homosexual 
sex.163 And carrying this reasoning with him, Blackmun concluded his dissent with a 
                                                                                                                                            
 160 See id. at 206. 
 161 See id. at 200 (“[T]he Court’s almost obsessive focus on homosexual activity is 
particularly hard to justify in light of the broad language Georgia has used. Unlike the Court, 
the Georgia Legislature has not proceeded on the assumption that homosexuals are so 
different from other citizens that their lives may be controlled in a way that would not be 
tolerated if it limited the choices of those other citizens. . . . [Hardwick]’s claim that [the 
Georgia anti-sodomy law] involves an unconstitutional intrusion into his privacy and his right 
of intimate association does not depend in any way on his sexual orientation.” (citations 
omitted)); see also id. at 202-03 (“I believe that Hardwick has stated a cognizable claim that 
[the Georgia anti-sodomy law] interferes with constitutionally protected interests in privacy 
and freedom of intimate association. . . . The Court’s cramped reading of the issue before it 
makes for a short opinion, but it does little to make for a persuasive one.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 162 See id. at 209 n.4 (citations omitted). Pamela Karlan, who was the clerk that aided 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Bowers, has acknowledged the possible connection between 
Blackmun and John Stuart Mill during the writing of the dissent, through Blackmun’s defense 
of H.L.A. Hart’s thesis against governmental interferences with privacy. TINSLEY E. 
YARBROUGH, HARRY A. BLACKMUN: THE OUTSIDER JUSTICE 285 (2008). 
 163 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Only the most willful 
blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is ‘a sensitive, key relationship of human 
existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human 
personality.’ The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through their 
intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there 
may be many ‘right’ ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of 
a relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of 
these intensely personal bonds. . . . The Court claims that its decision today merely refuses to 
recognize a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy; what the Court really has 
refused to recognize is the fundamental interest of all individuals have in controlling the 
nature of their intimate associations with others.” (citations omitted)).  
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hope toward future change that also leveraged incrementalism. “It took but three 
years for the Court to see the error in its analysis in Minersville School District v. 
Gobitis,”164 Blackmun wrote, conveying his “hope that here, too, the Court soon will 
reconsider its analysis and conclude that depriving individuals of the right to choose 
for themselves how to conduct their intimate relationship poses a far greater threat to 
the values most deeply rooted in our Nation’s history than tolerance of 
nonconformity could ever do.”165 His hope would have to stretch not three years, as 
in Gobitis, but 17.  
2. Lawrence 
The facts of Lawrence v. Texas involved two men, John Geddes Lawrence and 
Tyler Gardner, who were arrested and charged in Houston, Texas after police there 
discovered them involved in consensual homosexual conduct that fell within the 
definition of “deviate sexual intercourse” under the Texas criminal code.166 They 
were both subsequently convicted under the same statute and their convictions were 
affirmed on appeal.167 When Lawrence did overturn Bowers in 2003, Justice 
Kennedy, in writing for the majority, targeted that interference with the right to 
determine one’s identity discussed by Blackmun.168 Although the Court bypassed an 
equal protection analysis and foreclosed the possibility of making sexual orientation 
a suspect class, the Court’s analysis focused on the substantive rights that resulted in 
one way in which the law de-regulated sexual identity.169  
Curiously, Lawrence’s use of a liberty analysis does not mean that the opinion 
harbored no aspect of equality-based jurisprudence or that the issue lacked overtones 
of inequality. In fact, Justice Kennedy observed that “[e]quality of treatment and the 
due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive 
guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter 
point advances both interests.”170 Perhaps in order to acknowledge that merit existed 
under equal protection, Kennedy seemed to note that the Texas statute had two 
layers within its offensiveness—that it both violated some protectable liberty interest 
in privacy and that it expressly criminalized conduct only if practiced by members of 
the same sex, which is why that law led to unequal treatment of sexual minorities: 
“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that 
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to 
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”171 Some have observed 
that Kennedy’s intertwining of privacy interests here with discrimination makes the 
                                                                                                                                            
 164 Id. at 213-14.  
 165 Id. 
 166 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2003); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-
563 (2003). 
 167 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563. 
 168 Id. at 577.  
 169 Id. at 574-75.  
 170 Id. at 575. 
 171 Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage, 78 
U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 300 (2011) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575). 
30https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol62/iss1/4
2014] WEATHER PERMITTING 31 
 
liberty claim in Lawrence somewhat equality-based.172 As Kim Forde-Mazrui has 
remarked, “[t]he majority’s expressed reason for [invalidating all anti-sodomy laws], 
however, was an equality-based concern over discrimination against gay and lesbian 
people if gender neutral anti-sodomy laws were permitted.”173  
But by focusing primarily on liberty rather than equality, Lawrence reached 
further in its scrutiny of the Texas statute because it also allowed the Court to 
examine not just who the Texas statute targeted, but also what the statute 
regulated.174 Again, because if the Georgia statute at issue in Bowers were to be left 
intact but only the Texas statute in Lawrence invalidated, a conclusion could be 
drawn that sodomy could be criminalized across orientations, which would have left 
undisturbed the potential of criminalizing homosexuality through anti-sodomy laws 
that did not expressly single out the sex of those caught in the act. Due process 
invalidated the sodomy statute in Texas and allowed the Lawrence Court to more 
easily give a uniform comment on anti-sodomy statutes across the board and 
decriminalize behavior that could represent a lifestyle based on sexual identity.175 
Kennedy exemplified an attribute of this broader focus when he discussed the 
similarities of both Bowers and Lawrence, pinpointing not on the narrower technical 
differences between the Texas and Georgia statutes where an equal protection 
discussion would highlight, but noting broadly the dangers and untenable effects of 
both laws to sexual minorities regardless of how they facially targeted the orientation 
of alleged offenders:  
The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do 
no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, 
have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human 
conduct, sexual behavior, and in the private of places, the home. The statutes do seek 
to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition 
in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as 
criminals.176 
As Kenji Yoshino has noted, the liberty analysis, as opposed to equal protection, 
characteristically hones in on the broad similarities amongst points of cultural 
pluralism as courts talk about what rights are protectable under due process in order 
to carve out an approach to civil rights jurisprudence.177 Justice Kennedy and the 
majority’s use of the liberty analysis here plays well into declaring that the 
criminalization of homosexual conduct, whether facially or non-facially same-sex 
                                                                                                                                            
 172 Id. at 300.  
 173 Id. at 301 (“To be precise, the majority in Lawrence relied on substantive due process 
grounds, invalidating all antisodomy laws, rather than the equal protection basis of Justice 
Sandra day O’Connor’s concurrence, which would have invalidated only antisodomy laws 
limited to same-sex participants.” (citations omitted)). 
 174 Id. at 304-05.  
 175 Id. at 301 (“To be precise, the majority in Lawrence relied on substantive due process 
grounds, invalidating all antisodomy laws, rather than the equal protection basis of Justice 
Sandra day O’Connor’s concurrence, which would have invalidated only antisodomy laws 
limited to same-sex participants.” (citations omitted)). 
 176 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
 177 See generally Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 792-
797 (2011). 
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indicative, has the potential of infringing on the private autonomous rights of sexual 
minorities: essentially criminalizing the private aspects of their lifestyles, and 
abbreviating their identities—and ability to express their identities—in that way.178 
Bowers exhibited this result indirectly when the opinion recited that Hardwick was 
self-identified as a “practicing homosexual,” which is why he fell within “imminent 
danger of arrest” under Georgia law.179 Although Hardwick needed to pronounce 
himself as a “practicing homosexual” for standing reasons in the suit, this self-
identification pointed to how the sodomy law promoted categories of “practicing” 
and “non-practicing” homosexuals and the demeaning consequence of 
criminalization for those homosexuals who “practiced” their own lifestyles and what 
it meant to those who felt obliged under the law to choose not to practice. Where 
Bowers refused to acknowledge this assumption, the implications in Lawrence drew 
this out.  
Kennedy’s slightly-indistinct calibration between due process and equal 
protection in Lawrence has not lacked criticism. One of the most prominent 
assessments pinpointed Kennedy’s failure to clearly articulate whether there was a 
fundamental right at issue in this case involving anti-sodomy laws. For example, 
Laurence Tribe has argued that in Lawrence, “the Court gave short shrift to the 
notion that it was under some obligation to confine its implementation of substantive 
due process to the largely mechanical exercise of isolating ‘fundamental rights.’”180 
Instead, what the opinion focused on were protectable interests framed within either 
privacy or liberty claims or both that resulted in a myriad of scholarly readings.181 
Without a more crystallized pronouncement that the arrests of Lawrence and Garner 
violated some sort of fundamental right, Lawrence’s articulation that consensual 
sodomy laws infringed upon adult private autonomy appeared less stable within that 
historical due process framework. This has led to some confusion.182  
But this muddled writing might have been deliberate to allow Romer, an equal 
protection case, to influence this opinion as Lawrence is replete with notions of anti-
discrimination. As we will see in Part IV, though Lawrence is not an equal 
protection case, the case also borrowed from Romer by harnessing the outlining of 
animus behind the criminalization of sodomy as bolstered by Bowers.   
Within the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory, the imprecision of Kennedy’s 
majority opinion in Lawrence—albeit sometimes producing significantly dire 
                                                                                                                                            
 178 Mark Strasser, Lawrence, Mill, and Same-Sex Relationships: On Values, Valuing, and 
the Constitution, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 285, 285 (2006) (“While the full ramifications of 
Lawrence will not be clear for some time, the decision at the very least suggests that same-sex 
relations and relationships, like different-sex relations and relationships, have positive worth, 
and that states are not free to stigmatize members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender 
(LGBT) community.”). 
 179 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 (1986). 
 180 Tribe, supra note 132, at 1898. 
 181 See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 132; see also Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 
MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1140 (2004); Randy E. Barnett, Grading Justice Kennedy: A Reply to 
Professor Carpenter, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1582, 1584 (2005). 
 182 See Anthony Marroney Noto, Lawrence and the Morality of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
After Lofton, Witt, and Cook: The Law Before and After the Appeal, 7 SETON HALL CIRCUIT 
REV. 155, 157-58 (2010). 
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consequences in actual lower court case law for gay litigants—lies in the scope in 
which the decision and its decriminalization of sodomy exists alongside subsequent 
moments in the gay rights movement. That shortcoming, particularly in the 
arguably-stunted reach of Lawrence’s precedent, signaled as just the first step in 
marriage equality incrementalism that much work still remained to be done. Despite 
some shortcomings, however, Lawrence did offer a significant advance from Bowers 
toward expanding and extending the rights of sexual minorities and recognition of 
same-sex relationships by targeting the antigay essentialism setup in Bowers and 
anti-sodomy laws. And marriage equality was another marker up another step that 
now seemed inevitable. Justice Scalia’s Pandora’s box reaction to the Lawrence 
majority in his dissent broadcasted this potential when he warned the public not to 
believe that the opinion would not end up “dismantl[ing] the structure of 
constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual 
and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.”183 
Prior to Windsor, several notable lower court cases after Lawrence arguably tamed 
the bite of Scalia’s remarks when they distinguished themselves from the opinion in 
dealing with anti-sodomy laws.184 But the murkiness of the Lawrence opinion, which 
led to such distancing in the post-Lawrence cases, highlighted that the goal toward 
recognizing same-sex identities was a lengthier tale—entwined between both the 
liberty and equality aspects of the Constitution. And Scalia, though on a problematic 
side of history, was actually right about Lawrence. 
Ultimately within identity expression, the decriminalization of consensual 
sodomy in Lawrence is a commentary on sexual identity. As step one in the 
Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory, the gesture from Lawrence elevated the worth of 
sexual minorities from being potential criminals or restricting their lives based on a 
private, otherwise autonomous behavior indicative of sexual orientation. What 
decriminalizing consensual sodomy in Lawrence did was recast identities for 
subsequent milestones in the marriage equality movement by beginning to remove 
the legal stigma traditionally placed upon the gay identity. As we shall see next, 
what Lawrence started was then extended by the repeal of the military’s separation 
policies against sexual minorities in Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.    
B. Anti-discrimination in the Repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell 
If, by decriminalizing consensual sodomy, Lawrence had recast the gay identity 
by not allowing certain previously-essentialized expressions of identity to trigger 
criminal status, then the 2011 repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (“DADT”)185 added to 
                                                                                                                                            
 183 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604-05 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 184 See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 
(11th Cir. 2004) (using differences between civil and criminal law systems to distinguish 
Lawrence in adoption case); United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 207-08 (Ct. App. A.F. 
2004) (finding that senior-subordinate same-sex activity in the military was unlike consensual 
sodomy protected under Lawrence); L.A.M. v. B.M., 906 So. 2d 942 (Ala. 2004) (finding that 
Lawrence would not protect lesbian mother from having her custody arrangement with ex-
husband modified); State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 234 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (distinguishing 
Lawrence in criminal case involving underage same-sex activity). 
 185 In this Article, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the accompanying acronym DADT refers in 
shorthand not only to the Clinton compromise of no longer permitting the military to ask 
affirmatively if a servicemember was a sexual minority, but as shorthand to describe the 
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Lawrence by not allowing sexual conduct and other expressions to become the basis 
for discrimination either—fulfilling the second step in Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk 
incrementalism. Lawrence had given efforts to repeal DADT a certain momentum. 
Even Antony Barone Kolenc, a critic of the repeal, has noted that  
[b]y the time of the 2000 Presidential election, it seemed the battle had been 
fought and won for the DADT policy. Storm clouds appeared on the horizon, 
however, when in 2003 the Supreme Court struck down a Texas law criminalizing 
homosexual conduct in the landmark case Lawrence v. Texas. Justice Anthony 
Kennedy penned a decision for the Court that created uncertainty about the 
constitutional status of homosexuals as a protected class. Reinvigorated opponents of 
DADT saw the possibility for renewed challenges in the courts. 186  
Kolenc’s “storm cloud” imagery here characterizing the improvements in gay 
rights echoes that NOM’s metaphoric portrayal of the gathering nimbus of same-sex 
marriage (nearly as an inciting motif for same-sex marriage opponents).187 In a 
negative way, this comparison to a portentous storm does truthfully relay the 
resonance that Lawrence possessed.  
1. DADT’s Rise 
On the more specific level of expressive liberty in the military, the period 
between Lawrence’s decriminalization of consensual same-sex intimacy and the 
repeal could be seen as a struggle between post-Lawrence views on sexual 
orientation and privacy, and the keenness of courts to defer to the military. 
Homosexuality and the U.S. military have always had an interesting history 
intertwined with identity expression and social visibility—much like anti-sodomy 
laws. From the early twentieth century, the military had established a longstanding 
policy of singling out sexual minorities, and like the anti-sodomy laws at issue in 
Lawrence and in Bowers, the DADT policy marginalized LGBT identities in the 
military through conduct—specifically via express self-referential conduct, conduct 
that is sexual and conduct that would otherwise tip off a likelihood of a homosexual 
orientation.188 In fact, one contributing historical genesis that fueled the military’s 
approach to discrimination was based on the criminalization of consensual sodomy 
in the military during the 1920s.189 Once the military criminalized consensual 
                                                                                                                                            
underlying legislation of separating LGBT servicemembers from the military in which the 
Congress enacted in 1993. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006) (repealed).  
 186 Antony Barone Kolenc, Pretend to Defend: Executive Duty and the Demise of “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell”,48 GONZ. L. REV. 107, 112 (2012) (footnotes omitted). 
 187 See Gathering Storm, supra note 1.  
 188 Daniel Ryan Koslosky, Sexual Identity as Personhood: Towards an Expressive Liberty 
in the Military Context, 84 N.D. L. REV. 175, 195 (2008) (“Don't Ask, Don't Tell also 
functionally replicates sodomy laws within the military context in that it criminalizes same-
sex intimacy. Pre-Lawrence sodomy laws did, like Don't Ask, Don't Tell, contain a message of 
societal disapproval of homosexual intimacy.”). 
 189 Fred L. Borch III, The History of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” in the Army: How We Got to 
It and Why It Is What It Is, 203 MIL. L. REV. 189, 190 (2010) (“History shows that the Army 
did not have much official interest in homosexuals and homosexual conduct until the 1920s, 
when consensual sodomy was criminalized for the first time in the AW [(Articles of War)], 
and the Army began administratively discharging gay Soldiers regardless of conduct.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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sodomy, a transference took place from criminalization of conduct that could 
externalize the identity of sexual minorities to actual exclusion of those who were 
homosexual, on the basis that homosexuality was an illness.190 At the time, 
homosexuality as pathology was a prevalent subscription, and in the military, this 
notion became a pretext that homosexuals were individuals who were “ill” and could 
not then serve in the military because that illness placed “afflicted” individuals 
below the mandated standards of health and well-being.191 Again, biology was 
placed behind the differentiation—with same-sex attraction now classified as a 
sickness. Once the American Psychological Association abandoned the notion of 
homosexuality as pathology in 1973, the military switched its reason for 
discriminating against homosexuals from illness to another essentialized hetero-
normative sentiment that homosexuality was just not compatible in the armed forces, 
specifically a threat to unit cohesion.192 But the continuation of sexual minorities 
serving in the military prompted the Clinton administration in 1993 to consider an 
executive order to lift the discrimination; before that happened, Congress passed 
legislation, essentially DADT, that met Clinton halfway—not banning sexual 
minority from service outright, just banning the openness of the perceived identity 
expression and existence of sexual minorities.193 In this legislation, expressions of 
LGBT identities in the military would have prompted investigation and possible 
separation from service.194 Expressions included conduct that would indicate self-
identification with the gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgendered identity—i.e. sexual 
behavior indicative of the lifestyle—or a self-identifying pronouncement—i.e. 
someone uttering the words, “I am gay.”195 
                                                                                                                                            
 190 Id. at 193 (“Shortly after the Congress criminalized consensual sodomy in the military, 
the Army also began using its medical regulations to bar gay men from enlisting. . . . This was 
a remarkable historical shift in the sense that homosexuality was now viewed—at least by the 
Army—as an illness rather than a sin or a crime.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 191 Id. (noting that “[t]he presence of gays in the Army could not be tolerated because, as a 
1923 Medical Department regulation stated, homosexuality was ‘sexual psychopathy,’ and, as 
sexual deviants, homosexuals were unfit for military service” (footnotes omitted)). 
 192 See id. at 199-200 (“Empirical research by psychologists and psychiatrists, changing 
societal views on the morality of sexual behavior, and the rise of a politically active GLBT 
community caused the American Psychiatric Association to declassify homosexuality as a 
mental disorder and removed it from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) II (2nd edition) in 1973. Some psychiatrists and psychoanalysts opposed to 
the declassification of homosexuality as a mental illness forced the Association's membership 
to vote on the issue the following year, but their view was rejected. As a result, by the late-
1970s the prevailing view in the medical community was that gays and lesbians were not 
sexual deviants and that there was no medical basis to exclude them from the Army. While the 
Army had long abandoned any claim that it was excluding gays and lesbians from its ranks for 
medical reasons, the lack of any credible medical support for discrimination against 
homosexuals in uniform meant that the Army now relied completely on good order and 
discipline as a rationale.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 193 Mark Thompson, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Turns 15, TIME (Jan. 28, 2008), http://www. 
time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1707545,00.html. 
 194 See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006) (repealed).  
 195 See id. § 654(b)(2). 
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Once sexual minorities were allowed to serve in the military, the discriminatory 
effect of the policy shifted from one of excluding sexual minorities to regulating 
how such identities were expressed. This shift affected how identity expression 
became more narrowly the isolated target of military separation actions. Again, this 
result of regulating identity expression had antigay essentialist roots. The DADT 
policy, up until its repeal, hindered the expression of identity by pressuring LGBT 
military members to hide their identities as sexual minorities if they intended to 
serve in the military.196 With the inclusion of these “silenced” homosexuals in the 
military, the continued justification to discriminate based on how sexual minorities 
would disrupt unit cohesion took on an even more nuanced layer as the policy now 
seemed to say it would not just be the homosexual who would disrupt unit cohesion, 
just the one who “practiced” or “flaunted” his or her homosexuality who would.197 
And ultimately, all of this rejection and reaction by the military was externally 
manifested by the regulation of conduct including the practice of consensual sodomy 
and sexual practices possibly indicative of LGBT identities, but difficult and 
problematic to link to the breaking of unit cohesion, which made the justification a 
pretense.    
By regulating identity expression, DADT’s preference for the silent homosexual 
over the openly-practicing homosexual implied several important things. First, 
hetero-normative traits were favored over perceived “homosexual” traits, which 
created a “compulsory heterosexuality.”198 This implication, in turn, suggested 
secondarily that hetero-normative traits in this sense could be “performed.”199 If 
DADT worked within a compulsion and presumption of heterosexuality, the hidden 
encouragement for a LGBT servicemember would not just be to keep silent about his 
or her sexual identity but to play into that heterosexual presumption because doing 
so would decrease potential of detection. The observation that gays in the military 
had to pass as straight if they wanted to avoid being persecuted is not novel by 
                                                                                                                                            
 196 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S. 
Military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1192-93 (1997) (“By 
forbidding expressions of gay identity in any form, at any time, and with any individual—
including a servicemember’s family and friends—the policy compels servicemembers 
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proposition, it remains the case that the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy capitalizes upon the 
heterosexual presumption to enforce a direct regulation of the sexual identities of gay and 
lesbian servicemembers.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. at 1158 (“Whether gay and lesbian servicemembers must affirm a heterosexual 
identity in words—as, frequently, they must—or whether their enforced silence is loud 
enough to claim the “default characterization” of heterosexual identity that most conversations 
offer, the background of social relations in the military, as in most other contexts, is one of 
presumptive, compulsory heterosexuality.” (footnote omitted)). 
 199 See id. at 1192 (“Similarly, although the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy contemplates that 
gay people will serve among the ranks of the armed forces, it relies upon the ideological 
imperative of the heterosexual presumption to place its brand upon them.”). 
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DADT standards, nor new prior to DADT. But DADT’s explicitness raised 
questions of performativity: that to remain safe from possible military inquiry and 
separation, a LGBT member must marginalize self-identification in order to perform 
or pass under mainstream hetero-normative scrutiny. This demand not only reflected 
an implication that self-expression more indicative of a LGBT identity was plainly 
undesirable but that hetero-normative traits are linked more closely to perceived 
essentialist assumptions of how a “good” soldier behaves or what characteristics a 
“good” soldier should embody.200 This discriminatory aspect becomes clearer when 
we see that, under DADT, only the “non-practicing,” “straight-acting,” and closeted 
LGBT servicemember would have prevailed (but of course, at great costs to his or 
her own identity expression) while non-gay servicemembers could talk about their 
relationships and romantic lives without persecution.201 This shows how the 
disapproval of sexual identities other than hetero-normative ones relegated LGBT 
servicemembers into a position of having to play safe.  
2. Challenging Essentialism and Deference 
Cases challenging DADT prior to Lawrence were, for the most part, abysmally 
unsuccessful to overcoming judicial deference to the military for adhering to unit 
cohesion and to other reasons open homosexuality was purportedly a threat.202 Post-
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bonding, and into brotherhood.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Wolff, supra note 196, at 1169-
70 (“The military is the primary site for the definition of manhood in American culture, and 
military service is the most important opportunity for citizens to attain that virtue. . . . The 
military’s definition of masculine virtue—a definition that has played a unique role in setting 
standards for citizenship status in America—has repeatedly found expression in 
discriminatory restrictions on the qualifications for military service.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 201 Wolff, supra note 196, at 1163.  
 202 See, e.g., Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding servicemember’s 
discharge did not violate equal protection or First Amendment rights); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 
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Lawrence cases achieved some progress in using Lawrence’s incremental impact on 
privacy, seeing some elevation in scrutiny review standards, but judicial results were 
generally mixed during this period in recognizing disapproval of gays that emanated 
from antigay essentialism to restrictions on identity expression.203 Unlike Lawrence, 
litigants in these cases hit against a wall of judicial deference to the military trying to 
find the kind of animus against sexual minorities that would have otherwise 
established unconstitutionality.  
Success came with the interesting translation of Lawrence into the gays in the 
military context through claims against the policy’s infringement on free speech 
expression in Log Cabin Republicans v. U.S.,204 which bolstered identity expression 
implications. The idea that DADT had infringed on the expressive rights of gay 
servicemembers has existed since its 1993 adoption. Relying on the Lawrence’s 
impact on the expression of identity to diminish the usual deference to the military 
by seeing that Lawrence as “recognizing the fundamental right to ‘an autonomy of 
self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate 
conduct,”205 the District Court in Log Cabin Republicans finally refused to defer to 
the military and held that self-referential statements—such as “I am gay”—
amounted not to merely evidentiary proof of actionable conduct under DADT, which 
is what other courts had held,206 but rather directly violating First Amendment free 
speech.207  
The impetus for DADT’s repeal, however, would not result from Log Cabin 
Republicans directly. Rather within the same year, efforts going toward the repeal 
would be accomplished by the Executive and Legislative branches in full swing. 
Eventually, in a move that bore similar sentiment to Log Cabin Republicans, 
President Obama, who had vowed to repeal DADT, and Congress moved to repeal 
the ban on open sexuality in the military208—a move that was incremental because it 
obtained the antidiscrimination within Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory, post-
decriminalization of sodomy. Several extensive reports and surveys commissioned to 
study a possible repeal reflected the specific regulatory consequences of DADT on 
identity expression, concluding that “repeal of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell will not 
                                                                                                                                            
F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding DADT’s policy reasoning survived rationality); Selland v. 
Perry, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding DADT constitutional); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 
F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding DADT via rationality). 
 203 See Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d. 806, 817-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that 
Lawrence provided a higher level of scrutiny than traditional rationality for plaintiff’s due 
process claim, but not finding such elevation in review in plaintiff’s equal protection claim); 
see also Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 49-52, 60 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding also that Lawrence 
allowed a higher level scrutiny of than rationality but that plaintiff’s challenges were 
unsuccessful against military deference). 
 204 Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884 (C.D. Cal 2010), vacated, 
658 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 205 Log Cabin Republicans, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 911.  
 206 See Cook, 528 F.3d at 62-63. 
 207 Log Cabin Republicans, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 926. 
 208 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED 
WITH A REPEAL OF “DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL” 27-28 (2010) [hereinafter DOD REPORT]. 
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have a negative impact on their ability to conduct their military mission”209 and that 
“the concern with repeal among many is with open service”210—in other words 
expressive liberty.  
The Report of the Comprehensive Review of the Issues Associated with a Repeal 
of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DOD Report) elaborated on just what “open service” 
meant with what seemed like a subtle nod to both Romer and Lawrence:  
In today’s civilian society, where there is no law that requires gay men and 
lesbians to conceal their sexual orientation in order to keep their job, most gay men 
and lesbians still tend to be discrete about their personal lives, and guarded about the 
people with whom they share information about their sexual orientation.211 
Later in another passage, the DOD Report acknowledged more explicitly the 
influence of anti-sodomy laws in the historical regulation of sexual identities in the 
military: “Prior to 1993, there was no Congressional statute that expressly regulated 
homosexuality in the U.S. military: homosexuality in the military was regulated and 
restricted through a combination of sodomy prohibitions in military law and military 
personnel regulations.”212 When the DOD Report recited the litigation history of 
DADT after its enactment in 1993, it revisited the influence of anti-sodomy laws on 
Bowers on DADT cases before Lawrence, noting that “[t]hese early Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell cases were decided against a backdrop of the Supreme Court’s 1986 
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.”213 However, the DOD Report then acknowledged 
the incongruity posed by the change in expressive privacy interests when Lawrence 
overruled Bowers and the existence of DADT in the face of Lawrence, and 
summarized Lawrence’s incremental impact on the case law post-2003.214   
The DOD Report was finally most demonstrative in rejecting the unit cohesion, 
effectiveness, and readiness arguments lurking at the opposing end of discriminatory 
arguments that litigants losing against DADT faced when courts reached to defer to 
the military—reasons that had previously by effect encouraged LGBT 
servicemembers not only to hide their sexual identities but play safe by emphasizing 
hetero-normative traits that aligned with how the military thought “a good soldier” 
might act.215 Relying on its extensive surveying, empirical assessments, and social 
science research, the DOD Report relayed that based on servicemembers’ “actual 
past and present experiences in a unit with someone they believed to be gay”216 in 
Marine combat units, Army combat units, and otherwise, the consensus for a 
positive rating on a unit’s cohesive ability to work together with individuals who 
were perceived to be gay or lesbian were substantially high—ranging the lowest 
from the 84% of Marine servicemembers in combat arms units surveyed approving, 
to 89% of Army servicemembers in combat arms units surveyed approving, to 92% 
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of overall military servicemembers surveyed approving, which as the DOD Report, 
touted were “all very high percentages.”217 More profoundly, the DOD Report 
surmised the hetero-normative implications of these responses—that “[t]hese survey 
results reveal to us a misperception that a gay man does not fit the image of a good 
war fighter, a misperception that is almost completely erased when a gay 
Servicemember is allowed to prove himself alongside fellow war fighters.”218 As an 
amusing anecdote, the DOD Report excerpted the words of one special ops 
servicemember in regards to misperceptions of sexual identity: “We have a gay guy 
[in the unit]. He’s big. He’s mean, and he kills lots of bad guys. No one cared that he 
was gay.”219 In one huge empirical gesture, the DOD Report refuted the prediction of 
negative impact by openly-LGBT servicemembers on unit cohesion and underscored 
how that prediction revealed the military’s preference of hetero-normative traits. 
Similarly, the RAND Update to its 1993 report, Sexual Orientation in the U.S. 
Military Personnel Policy220 (Update) which was commissioned as part of the 2010 
study on a possible DADT repeal, also heavily criticized the misperceptions and 
preferences of identity expression DADT reinforced, perpetuated, and regulated. The 
Update drew on comprehensive surveys as well,221 and in one section detailing the 
presence and awareness of LGBT servicemembers in the military, the Update noted 
that of the LGBT servicemembers surveyed about their “own behavior in disclosing 
their orientation within their units,” an aggregate of “two-thirds of respondents 
reported that they either pretend to be heterosexual or hide their orientation from 
other unit members, and most others are selective in deciding to whom and in what 
circumstances they disclose their sexual orientations.”222  
Bowing toward incrementalism, the Update briefly mentioned Lawrence and 
how decriminalizing same-sex intimacy ten years after DADT’s enactment had 
changed the context in which the previous RAND research was based, particularly in 
summarizing identity expression.223 At the midpoint of this chapter on the personnel 
disclosures of sexual orientation, the Update’s assessment subtly implicates a 
rudimentary assumption of sexual orientation that DADT and the historical military 
policies had on LGBT individuals.224 Repeatedly, the Update noted that sexual 
orientation—although possibly expressed through sexual behavior—and sexual 
behavior—although possibly expressive of sexual orientation—were not always 
mutually inclusive nor conclusive of one another, that self-identification of 
orientation, whether heterosexual or not, does not in every case necessarily lead to 
sexual behavior that corresponds to that identification and vice versa: “Shifts in 
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orientation are particularly likely as a consequence of maturation—a process referred 
to as sexual-identity development.”225 If read against DADT, this observation seems 
to point out the limits to the military’s previously-powerful, animus-driven directive 
to exclude gays in the military—that homosexuality is not now a pathology, as it was 
once historically considered; not a threat for excluding sexual minorities, as it was 
believed; not a basis for criminalization, but rather a seemingly non-threatening part 
of human maturation: “Given that enlisted personnel are typically young adults, 
some individuals who do not see themselves as gay or do not engage in same-sex 
activity before they enter the military may do so some time after enlisting.”226 Again, 
essentialist notions of sexual orientation had been used as a pretextual justification of 
a policy hindering identity expression.  
In commenting on DADT’s attempt to reinforce fixed traits amongst military 
personnel, the Update showed data suggesting that many LGBT servicemembers not 
only “pretend[ed] to be heterosexual” but did so in ways that resulted in exhibiting 
traits of “good soldiers”227—traits that were stereotypically subsumed under the 
military’s outlook on gender characteristic preferences, traits that have been utilized 
in contrast to a characterized and stigmatized view of non-heterosexual identities.228 
Such data point to the fluidity of sexual identity and direct the harm of DADT’s 
categorization of sexual identity back to an abridged personal autonomy shared by 
Lawrence.229 As discussed above, although Lawrence was facially concerned with 
the intrusion into personal privacy and autonomy that anti-sodomy laws effected, 
one of the broader undertow of Lawrence was situated within the way that states 
fixated upon criminalizing sodomy as a way to curtail identity expression. Similarly, 
regulating behavior and self-identifying speech in DADT intruded upon personal 
autonomy rights through suppressing expression in LGBT servicemembers, but the 
experience of DADT facially added upon Lawrence because of the way DADT 
invaded not only sexual behavior, but other everyday conduct that would be 
indicative of a LGBT identity—including identity speech.230 This spill-over into 
other kinds of conduct juxtaposed with the fluidity of identities and the performance 
of identities within the military exposed the difficulty and inconsistencies of 
regulating the social visibility of homosexuality. The extension from Lawrence of 
violations within personal autonomy indicate the level of struggle of LGBT 
individuals when confronted by this policy in the military—where perhaps as 
Lawrence had mandated that such identities could no longer be criminalized, the 
                                                                                                                                            
 225 Id. at 105. 
 226 Id. 
 227 See id. at 264. 
 228 See Koslosky, supra note 188, at 193. 
 229 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (“Persons in a homosexual 
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do. The 
decision in Bowers would deny them this right.”). 
 230 “[O]n its face, the Act discriminates based on the content of the speech being regulated. 
It distinguishes between speech regarding sexual orientation, and inevitably, family 
relationships and daily activities, by and about gay and lesbian servicemembers, which is 
banned, and speech on those subjects by and about heterosexual servicemembers, which is 
permitted.” Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 926 (C.D. Cal 
2010), vacated, 658 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2011). 
41Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014
42 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1 
sentiment did not foreclose the idea that such identities could still be selectively 
marginalized into inconspicuousness. In fact, the incrementalist impact of 
Lawrence’s decriminalization of same-sex intimacy and what it meant for identity 
expression could be noted in the acknowledgment of Lawrence in the 2010 
congressional findings on repealing of the DADT policy.231 
The about-face toward the perceived threat to unit cohesion and military 
readiness and disapproval of LGBT identities could be partly attributed to the change 
in perception in the way sexual identities have been allowed expressive liberty and 
visibility in the social fabric since Bowers and even since Lawrence. The repeal 
officially took place in late September 2011.232 The DOD Report and Update have 
suggested little or minimal impact on unit cohesion or negligible levels of 
interruption in operations.233 Studies since the repeal have continuously bolstered 
such conclusions.234 These commissioned studies harnessed the changing attitudes 
regarding the characterization of sexual minorities in the military and the burgeoning 
disconnect between open presence of their identities and optimum operational 
benefits shook the military’s traditional belief that only a certain kind of sexual 
identity should be imprinted and preferred amongst the ranks. Once this animus 
dislodged the rational relationship between the DADT policy and its goals, the 
judicial deference that courts used in the past appeared less relevant and the 
discriminatory aspects of DADT were, for the most part, finally clarified and 
realized. What the repeal did bring was antidiscrimination for LGB servicemembers 
so that such identities could be asked about and told without that traditional 
hindrance. And that change, despite some limitations, helped propel the 
incrementalist journey for the next step federally: the legal recognition of same-sex 
couples.  
C. Bond over Biology in U.S. v. Windsor 
In late February 2013, a month before the Hollingsworth and Windsor arguments 
at the Supreme Court, another video about same-sex marriage descended upon the 
cultural airwaves. This time, however, unlike NOM’s “Gathering Storm,” the 
message was set on a lush, paradisiac beach resort rather than before a computer-
generated storm.235 The scenario started simply: two young, fairly-attractive 
strangers of the opposite sex are each sitting in adjacent beach chairs on the grassy 
knoll of a beach resort, and each with a tablet in hand. Bright sunlight and the 
churning of waves consistently highlight the backdrop.236 The woman, trim in a 
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black swimsuit with her hair slicked back as if she had just finished a swim, 
effortlessly reads off her Kindle tablet, when the man, in shorts and a beach shirt and 
struggling with the unavoidable glare of sunlight on his iPad, interrupts the woman 
and asks her about the functionality of her Kindle; she responds favorably, noting its 
features, and how perfect it is for the beach.237 The man then turns back to the screen 
of his iPad and, with much satisfaction, navigates his finger on his iPad screen to 
buy a Kindle as well.238 When he smilingly turns over to look at the woman and 
suggests, “We should celebrate,” in an ambiguous tone, friendly enough to frame his 
suggestion as a pick-up line, the woman rejects him: “My husband’s bringing me a 
drink right now.”239 What adds complexity to the scene is the man’s unexpected 
response, “So is mine,” as they both gesture over to the resort bar behind them to 
show each other that their husbands are, in a mirror-like image, on common ground, 
each fetching drinks.240 The man’s celebratory suggestion was not nearly as amorous 
as the woman (and likely the TV audience) had assumed. It was genuinely 
celebratory.  
This advertisement—promulgated by internet retailing giant Amazon.com to 
promote its tablet241—aired several months after the Obama re-election and just 
weeks after Obama’s presidential inaugural address had vowed to bring equal rights 
to sexual minorities.242 The country was heating up dramatically with more fervor 
toward marriage equality and any possibility of a gathering storm was dissipating; 
and instead, momentum was surging for same-sex couples more than ever before. 
Although the visibility of wedded same-sex couples vacationing on sandy beach 
resorts alongside their different-sex counterparts remains slight, the Kindle ad, like 
the man gesturing toward his husband at the bar, was itself gesturing toward an ideal 
and a possible norm if the laws were to extend marriage rights to gay couples. Again, 
as the ad itself concluded with a camera pan toward a lucid blue sky—that very anti-
thesis of an impending storm—the ad also conveys the message that something far 
beyond Kindle tablets and same-sex marriages perpetuates here. This reading is 
especially possible after the ad’s protagonists had motioned to their respective 
husbands at the bar and a moment passes where it is difficult to tell which husband at 
the bar belonged with which of the two speaking characters of the ad.243 The 
commercial emphasizes similarities to a point where the differences between the gay 
and straight characters seemed insignificant and slightly surprising. 
As previously seen, this focus on the similarities between sexual minorities and 
the mainstream in areas other than marriage has not always been so forthright. States 
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characterized biological differences within sex acts to criminalize sodomy and the 
military used essentialized and stereotypical traits between sexual minorities and 
heterosexuals to distinguish between “good” and “bad” soldiers for purposes of 
exclusion.244 These approaches thrived within the law generally and laws 
surrounding marriage also reiterated the antigay essentialism used to marginalize the 
relationships between same-sex and different-sex couples. Conventionally, in fact, 
essentialism, in aiding natural law and religious morality, has continuously 
influenced state refusal to recognize same-sex couples for the purposes of 
marriage—and in much the same manner to differentiate and then marginalize sexual 
minorities as with anti-sodomy laws and military exclusion.  
1. DOMA’s Natural Teleology 
The most glaring example of how antigay essentialism buttressed the marriage 
issue on the federal level is through the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) passed in 
1996.245 In discerning how the Supreme Court’s review of the Windsor case fulfills 
our normatively revised step three of the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory of 
incrementalism—where same-sex marriage can be part of the legal recognition of 
same-sex couples—our enquiry first starts with the essentialist approach within 
marriage laws that has helped exclude sexual minorities. As the Court has 
destabilized that approach after the 2012-2013 term, we again will see with Windsor 
that the same-sex marriage debate is more than just about the concept of same-sex 
marriage and that it is the social visibility and the expression of sexual orientation 
that is ultimately at stake.  
Prior to Windsor, Section 3 of DOMA had fixed the definition of marriage so 
that federally, “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any 
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and 
agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between 
one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a 
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”246 Within the congressional 
thought-process leading up to DOMA’s passage, biology was again raised as the 
reason why marriage has traditionally been fixed as a union between different-sex 
individuals and why same-sex unions could not be recognized under that label.247 
The House of Representatives report exuded heterosexism in its accounts toward 
“defending” marriage in an essentialist configuration when it deferred, at length, to 
Hadley Arkes’ testimony for authority on the subject matter:  
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Our engendered existence, as men and women, offers the most 
unmistakable, natural signs of the meaning and purpose of sexuality. And 
that is the function and purpose of begetting. At its core, it is hard to 
detach marriage from what may be called the “natural teleology of the 
body”: namely the inescapable fact that only two people, not three, only a 
man and woman, can beget a child.248  
Procreation was the proclaimed goal of marriage between different-sex couples 
and by consequence, the House concluded that “civil society has an interest in 
maintaining and protecting the institution of heterosexual marriage because it has a 
deep and abiding interest in encouraging responsible procreation and childrearing. 
Simply put, government has an interest in marriage because it has an interest in 
children.”249 The permanency of this “natural teleology of the body” was 
assembled—if not by implying at first procreation itself and the biological tie-in to 
the “body”—by a quote used in the House report from the Council on Families in 
America that underscored that marriage exists as “our most universal social 
institution, found prominently in virtually every known society”250 because of “the 
irreplaceable role that marriage plays in childrearing and generational continuity.”251 
By falsely reaching toward the universal, the interest of procreation and childrearing 
was propped as the biological and natural reason why marriage has been exclusively 
for different-sex couples.  
This hetero-normative tautology (or “teleology”) leads easily to an implicit 
dichotomy that excludes unions not biologically embodying that “natural teleology 
of the body” to qualify for the marriage label: ones that also exist in the world but 
did not historically procreate. That differentiation stands exactly for why DOMA 
secured the marriage label for different-sex unions but not same-sex ones; the 
artificial focus on biology spotlights the reproductive potential of different-sex 
couples as the prominent reason for keeping marriage from same-sex couples when 
other reasons why marriages exist are possible—reasons that could allow for 
including other relationship configurations within marriage. Most patent in its use of 
essentialism as a shield to prop up the exclusion of same-sex couples in marriage 
was the House’s anticipation and rejection of two possible rebuttals to its essentialist 
tautology, rebuttals that would quash constructionist sentiments to marriage. First, 
the House claimed that the fact that the law allows different-sex couples to marry 
without indicating their intent to have children was a negligible one because the 
underlying procreative policy of marriage reserves the institution for those couples 
who do: “[S]ociety has made the eminently sensible judgment to permit 
heterosexuals to marry, notwithstanding the fact that some couples cannot or simply 
choose not to have children.”252 Similarly, the House also raised the “divorce 
revolution” as an argued threat to marriage that overshadowed the changes that 
same-sex couples might bring to the institution.253 Although the report 
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acknowledged the disruption to childrearing that divorce brought to the traditional 
nuclear family—which could have been interpreted to signify that procreation likely 
was not the underlying teleology of the body that bodes essential for marriage—the 
House, nevertheless, found that because threats already existed in marriages between 
different-sex individuals, it would be imperative to protect marriage from other 
perceived threats including that of same-sex couples gathering and readying to storm 
across the gates of marriage to push that natural teleology off its course: “[T]he fact 
that marriage is embattled is surely no argument for opening a new front in the 
war.”254 The House’s rhetorical responses to both of these rebuttals revealed how 
essentialism was harnessed to prolong an exclusion that would never envision the 
hypothetical couple in the Kindle commercial, but align itself rather with the 
sentiments of NOM’s looming, tempestuously hyperbolic panic over same-sex 
marriage. The opponents are always seemingly spotting a brewing storm somewhere.  
This kind of strategy behind DOMA for keeping marriage restricted to same-sex 
couples falls squarely in line with the classic paradigms of the marriage institution 
used to hinder legal recognition of same-sex marriages. Early litigation of marriage 
equality in the 1970s upheld the exclusion of marriage from same-sex couples based 
on the finding that historically marriage between different-sex couples was 
“uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family”255 and 
saw this consequence as permanent and “as old as the book of Genesis.”256 Often this 
biological difference was then intertwined with natural law and Judeo-Christian 
arguments to create a wall of reasoning that excluded same-sex couples based on 
procreation and childrearing to swallow up other existing justifications for marriage 
that would focus the attention toward a constructivist notion of marriage.257 Marta 
Nussbaum has criticized this focus on the biological aspect by attempting to define 
marriage more broadly, observing that “[t]he institution of marriage houses and 
supports several distinct aspects of human life: sexual relations, friendship and 
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companionship, love, conversation, procreation and child rearing, mutual 
responsibility. Marriages can exist without each of these.”258 By cataloging other 
justifications for marriage, Nussbaum raises the idea of marriage as a construct that 
includes essentialist goals, and sheds light on how it is a construct that has been 
hijacked by marriage equality opponents, such as those who have advocated 
successfully for the passing of DOMA and campaigned for Proposition 8 in ways 
that molded that construction with a false sense of fixed biology, rather than 
allowing marriage to be “plural in both content and meaning.”259  
For sexual minorities specifically, a definition based on false teleology has had a 
regulatory effect on the identity expression. Analogous to how civil unions and 
domestic partnerships could be seen as laws that can classify same-sex couples as 
second-class citizens, the refusal to extend marriage to same-sex couples, as a result 
of defining marriage according to teleology, is another similar way in which the law 
can brand sexual minorities as the lesser. And this result arises directly from 
hindering the identities of sexual minorities again—like the instances noted from 
Bowers and DADT—from being expressed in any meaningful and comparable way 
that heterosexual identities are expressed. Scholars have noted this type of 
performativity for sexual orientation within the personal relationships that people 
cultivate that could end up as marriages.260 According to Douglas NeJaime recently, 
“[s]exual orientation by its very nature includes an active, relational component. 
Sexual orientation identity is linked to (both actual and contemplated) relationships 
with other bodies.”261 The social, relationship (or relational) aspect of one’s life can 
be the tip-off—so to speak—of one’s sexual orientation. NeJaime cites and 
synthesizes the works of others such as Kenji Yoshino, Janet Halley, Hau-ling Lau, 
and Mary Anne Case, as well, to show that others have made the particular 
observation that in the public and social sphere one could externalize one’s sexual 
identity via the image of a couple.262 His emphasis is on the visible “enactment” of 
orientation through relationships:  
Conduct, in the form of same-sex relationships, enacts lesbian or gay 
identity. Entering, performing, and publicly showing a same-sex 
relationship serves as a central way of embracing and maintain one’s 
lesbian or gay identity. This goes beyond the idea that intimate 
relationships are important to selfhood and identity, instead explicitly 
linking a certain type of relationship to a specific identity. Same-sex 
relationships, in this sense, publicly enact lesbian and gay identity.263 
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As Mary Anne Case writes compatibly, “[t]he couple is a mediating term 
between status and conduct, private and public, sameness and difference, and the 
sexual and nonsexual aspects of gay identity. Just as ‘couple is both a noun and a 
verb, and in a gay couple conduct and status slip ineluctably into one another.”264 An 
individual’s sexual orientation is observable distinctly through relationships. And as 
Case observes further, the visibility of relationships and coupling behavior is hard to 
deny since slippage between the grammatical definitions of the word also translates 
to how “[t]he couple can be simultaneously the situs for the most private of intimate 
relationships and the most public representation of it. And in a gay couple the signs 
of sameness and difference with respect to heterosexual pairs are both clearly 
visible.”265 Thus, in some ways similar to how skin color could express race, 
relationships are part of how sexual identity is expressed and how different sexual 
identities can be differentiated.  
And within inequalities of power and social visibility, that differentiation for 
sexual identities has led to marginalization. From behind the bench, Judge Stephen 
Reinhardt, writing for the Ninth Circuit in the majority decision in Perry v. 
Brown,266 articulated a sentiment similar to Case’s notion of differentiation but 
furthers it even more in the realm of social and legal visibility when he recounted the 
visible performativity of orientation in the context of heterosexual coupling behavior 
and marriage in order to raise consciousness to the existing inequality that the law 
(and society) has placed on same-sex coupling behavior:  
We are regularly given forms to complete that ask us whether we are 
“single” or “married.” Newspapers run announcements of births, deaths, 
and marriages. We are excited to see someone ask, “Will you marry me?”, 
whether on bended knee in a restaurant or in text splashed across a 
stadium Jumbotron. Certainly it would not have the same effect to see 
“Will you enter into a registered domestic partnership with me?”.267  
Reinhart illustrates how the law restricts the expressive acts of couples and how 
that restriction is tied to sexual identity. Because of the restriction on relationships, 
none of these expressive acts of coupling has as much visibility for sexual minorities 
as they are commonplace for different-sex couples—although they could. Within the 
context of domestic partnerships, the outline of a second-class citizen connotation is 
clearly drawn in the subtext of Reinhart’s illustration. Reinhart intimates that 
ubiquitously different-sex couples can and do propose marriage on Jumbotrons at 
sports games; it is a spectacle when it happens because it celebrates and reifies 
marriage, and it is also likely a bit mundane since every different-sex couple more 
easily possess that option.268 Same-sex couples are precluded from having that 
frequent opportunity, and any proposal for an alternative to marriage exhibited on 
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Jumbotrons just seem symbolically lesser.269 This marginalization of identity 
expression stems from the law and its value judgments on same-sex relationships.  
If marriage is, as Nussbaum describes, a construct, and if coupling behavior, 
including marital status, is an expression of sexual orientation, then the marriage 
restriction to only opposite sex couples and not same-sex couples regulate—with 
much the same result as anti-sodomy laws and DADT—the identity expression of 
sexual minorities. Essentializing the differences between sexual orientations lies at 
the core of refusing to extend marriage to same-sex couples. And federally, in 
progressing onto the revised final step in the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory—the 
legal recognition of same-sex relationships, including marriage equality itself—the 
Supreme Court’s review of DOMA in Windsor unfastens that entanglement with 
antigay essentialism in order to surmount another transition away from essentialist 
approach to sexual identity.  
2. Windsor and the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships 
As if almost an acknowledgment of incrementalism, it was ten years to the day of 
the Lawrence decision when the Supreme Court released its opinion in Windsor.270 
Again, Kennedy authored another gay rights decision this time; and instead of 
dealing with sexual conduct between consensual adults, he would find the federal 
definition of marriage in section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional.271 Specifically, 
Windsor’s rejection of the definition of marriage as exclusively reserved for 
different-sex couples was premised on an approach that moved dramatically away 
from the negative essentializing of sexual orientation—but does not yet fully endorse 
a pro-gay constructivist approach to sexual orientation, despite focusing on marriage 
as a bond in Windsor in similar fashion to Nussbaum. Windsor does account for the 
conduct and significance behind marriage for the purposes of broadening the 
definition, rather than place a heavy reliance on biology. But it must be carefully 
noted that there was no simultaneous adoption of constructivism in any real capacity. 
The plaintiff, Edith Windsor, and her deceased spouse, Thea Spyer, had been a 
couple since 1963 and were formally domestic partners in New York City in 1993 
before later marrying in 2007 in Canada.272 After marriage, they continued their lives 
in New York City, and New York State legally recognized their Canadian 
marriage.273 When Spyer passed away in 2009, she left her entire estate to Windsor, 
but because DOMA did not recognize same-sex marriages, Windsor was not 
qualified for the marital exemption under federal estate taxes.274 After paying 
$363,053 in estate taxes from the IRS, she subsequently sought a refund, but was 
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denied the request.275 Windsor then brought the suit that would eventually invalidate 
Section 3 of DOMA.276  
The Court’s disapproval of DOMA was two-fold: first it offended federalism 
principles and secondly it discriminated against same-sex couples.277 Both of 
DOMA’s harsh results were accomplished in some way via the essentialization of 
marriage. In illustrating the unconstitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA, Windsor 
focused on how the federal definition of marriage as between man and woman 
overstepped the boundaries of states’ prerogatives in determining their own 
definitions—specifically addressing the intervention that DOMA conceived against 
the ability for states to participate in the process of patchwork incrementalism as 
Jane Schacter had observed in which states are already engaged.278 And what 
Windsor found was that such intervention struck at states’ ability to define the 
marital relationship.279 As a result, the Court saw DOMA’s intervention created 
“injury and indignity”280 in the form of “a deprivation of an essential part of the 
liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment”281—especially when DOMA removed a 
right federally from a class of people that New York state specifically empowers: the 
right of same-sex individuals to have their coupling behavior be expressed as a 
lawful marriage, or in essence, the expression of sexual identity for sexual minorities 
on the state level to be consistent with the federal.282 This deprivation was also on 
top of the other deprivations the majority noticed resided in other realms including, 
inter alia, taxes, benefits, housing, criminality, and intellectual property.283 The 
deprivation reflected conflicts between federal and state incrementalisms; DOMA 
did not deprive different-sex married couples from New York from recognition on 
the federal level, but did so against same-sex couples who were also married by New 
York law. These effects demonstrated both federalism and also discriminatory 
results.   
In gearing up to apply an enhanced rational basis analysis to DOMA, Kennedy 
shed light on that injury and indignity by finding that the definition of marriage need 
not be predicated on biology: “In acting first to recognize and then allow same-sex 
marriages, New York was responding ‘to the initiative of those who [sought] a voice 
in shaping the destiny of their own times.’ ”284 Rather than relying on the “natural 
teleology of the body,” the Court approached the purpose of marriage as less 
biologically or essentially determined, underlining the constructive element of 
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marriage where the union could have the different meanings that Nussbaum has 
articulated, meanings tied to the person, and that perhaps the policy of regulating 
marriage should reflect that concept of marriage. In viewing marriage, the Court 
reconstructed the definition in order to see it as “a far-reaching legal 
acknowledgment of the intimate relationships between two people, a relationship 
deemed by the State worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other 
marriages.”285 When the Court placed New York State’s recognition of same-sex 
marriages within “far-reaching,”286 the description, “far-reaching,” implies more 
than a fixed biology. And the Court did not want to disturb that “far-reaching” 
approach because “[i]t reflects both the community’s considered perspective on the 
historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the 
meaning of equality.”287 Marriage is an institution that is not fixed in meaning but 
historically ever-evolving to service the social context in which it reflects, which 
means it can embrace cultural pluralist views about the institution.288 Intrinsically, 
the Windsor majority viewed marriage in a less essentialist way than those who 
stood behind a “natural” teleology to propagate DOMA.   
The Court could have included and merely subordinated essentialist views of 
marriage as just one of the myriad of justifications within a constructivist spectrum 
of marriage. Yet, Windsor found in its enhanced rational basis analysis how 
essentialism was isolated and manipulated into a construction of its own that made 
salient and viable the natural law and religious arguments against extending marriage 
to same-sex couples, but also allowed enough severe approbation against sexual 
minorities to amount to legislative animus. Here is where animus-focused 
jurisprudence has its continuation from Romer and maturation in Windsor as the 
Court now unleashed it in the issue of same-sex marriage. Kennedy wrote that “[t]he 
House concluded that DOMA expresses ‘both moral disapproval of homosexuality, 
and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional 
(especially Judeo-Christian) morality.’ ”289 In order to reach that moral disapproval 
and defend marriage, the House first had to argue for that natural teleology of the 
body, it had to go toward biology and use it to draw up differences between same-
sex couples and different-sex couples—homosexuals and heterosexuals—that could 
be used to marginalize the way that identity could be expressed and ultimately 
regulated it in a discriminatory way.290 The Court mentioned, inter alia, “stigma,”291 
“second-class,”292 and “second-tier,”293 to characterize how DOMA visualized the 
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relationships of sexual minorities—and perhaps, by extension, sexual minorities 
themselves—on the federal level, and the result was multi-faceted; not only did the 
exclusion have significance within marriage itself on a general wave but it also 
resonated in the apparent conflict between New York and federal laws.294 The Court 
opined that “DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned 
marriages and make them unequal” and illustrated in a conflated way just how 
DOMA interfered with state law and at the same time discriminated against same-
sex couples. Not only that but “[b]y this dynamic DOMA undermines both the 
public and private significance of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages; for it tells 
those couples, and all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of 
federal recognition. . . . The differentiation demeans the couple[.]”295 The Court 
remarked that this marginalization had significance for children of same-sex 
families,296 which stretched the social visibility impact of DOMA even further, and 
echoed Kennedy’s remarks at oral arguments.297 Ultimately, all of this 
differentiation, all of this indignity, all of this moral disapproval by DOMA had a 
starting point: the misappropriation of essentialism to dominate a discriminatory 
viewpoint. In Windsor, the Court abandoned that old essentialist approach of 
viewing marriage and moved toward a commonalities approach that recognizes that 
the bond of marriage needs more consideration than biological differences between 
same-sex and different-sex relationships.298 This view differs from the us-versus-
them dichotomy that the NOM’s “Gathering Storm” ad stressed, and situates us all 
getting drinks at the beach bar in the Amazon.com ad. It is a broader approach that 
would permit—though the Court did not declaratively endorse here—constructivist 
readings of marriage, and possibly, by extension, constructivist approaches to sexual 
identity. And as step three of Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory was being met on the 
federal level by the review of the marriage equality issue in Windsor, the recognition 
that the past discrimination has violated the dignity of sexual minorities by 
subordinating and regulating their identities also ushers in another moment where an 
antigay essentialism was detached from this realm of sexual orientation law.  
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3. Windsor and Revised Step Three in the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk Incrementalism 
Throughout Windsor, the notion of incrementalism is apparent. The Court’s 
acknowledgment “that, until recent years, many citizens had not even considered the 
possibility that two persons of the same sex might aspire to occupy the same status 
and dignity as that of a man and woman in lawful marriage,”299 that different-sex 
relationships have “no doubt had been thought of by most people as essential to the 
very definition of the term,”300 and that within the recent challenges “came the 
beginnings of a new perspective, a new insight,”301 illustrates stratagems of slow, 
incremental negotiations in the decision-making process that has led up to the 
moment in Windsor. Likewise, the Court noted incrementalist decision-making in 
New York’s adoption of same-sex marriage—through piecemeal steps over a period 
of time:  
Slowly at first and then in rapid course, the laws of New York came to 
acknowledge the urgency of this issue for same-sex couples who wanted to affirm 
their commitment to one another before their children, their family, their friends, and 
their community. And so New York recognized same-sex marriages performed 
elsewhere; and then it later amended its own marriage laws to permit same-sex 
marriage.302 
And it was “[a]fter a statewide deliberative process that enabled its citizens to 
discuss and weigh arguments for and against same-sex marriage, New York acted to 
enlarge the definition of marriage to correct what its citizens and elected 
representatives perceived to be an injustice that they had not earlier known or 
understood.”303 In both passages, the Court drew the endgame of the incrementalist 
unit here with the law of New York allowing same-sex couples to express their 
relationships—their same-sex relationships—in the same light as possibly different-
sex relationships, avoiding the previous injustices. And the process was through 
deliberate and gradual thought indicative of Lindblom’s incrementalism.    
Additionally, the acknowledgement toward incrementalism is reflected 
substantively in Windsor by Kennedy’s reference to Lawrence during the moments 
where the majority weakened DOMA’s authority over regulating relationships. Both 
instances where the Court explicitly mentioned Lawrence, that muddled protection 
over consensual same-sex intimacy was converted into the protected privacy of 
consenting adult relationships—including same-sex ones—that could be used to 
dislodge DOMA’s regulatory command over same-sex couples. Windsor builds 
incrementally from the significance of Lawrence on privacy and relationships, but 
interestingly, the Court also used Lawrence to gesture away from essentialism. In the 
first quotation of Lawrence, the Court used Lawrence to focus on the commitment 
aspect of a relationship rather than biology: “Private, consensual sexual intimacy 
between two adult persons of the same sex may not be punished by the State, and it 
can form ‘but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.’”304 The Court’s 
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second direct Lawrence quotation uncovered how that focus on biology created 
separate categories hindering identity expression in a shameful way for sexual 
minorities: “The differentiation [by DOMA] demeans the couple, whose moral and 
sexual choices the Constitution protects, see Lawrence, [citations omitted], and 
whose relationship the State has sought to dignify.”305 In both references, the 
Windsor Court harnessed Lawrence’s potency in privacy and broadened it to 
highlight incrementalist and anti-essentialist aspects of the opinion. As we will 
explore shortly, this borrowing from Lawrence bears importance in animus-focused 
jurisprudence. 
Windsor also recognizes Schacter’s patchwork or federalist incrementalism, not 
just by its deference to states’ rights in regulating domestic relationships of citizenry 
and limiting how much federal powers can interfere with states marriage definitions, 
but also by noticing how many states that have now moved toward marriage 
equality: “New York, in common with, as of this writing, 11 other States and the 
District of Columbia, decided that same-sex couples should have the right to 
marry[.]”306 Other such incidental references run throughout the decision, helping 
the Court articulate that DOMA acts “[a]gainst this background of lawful same-sex 
marriage in some States,”307 and that DOMA’s “operation is directed to a class of 
persons that the laws of New York, and of 11 other States, have sought to 
protect.”308 By constantly reminding the public that DOMA persisted on a stage 
conflicting with a small, but growing handful of states that legally recognizes the 
marriages of same-sex couples, the Court also perpetuated that patchwork 
incrementalism occurring within the prerogatives of federalism and without any 
unneeded interference. The patchwork incrementalist effect possessed much 
significance for the Windsor Court because it allowed the majority to exemplify the 
intervention that DOMA’s definition of marriage placed against states’ rights and 
also—in New York state’s circumstance—the discriminatory slippage between 
recognizing married same-sex couples on the state level, but not the federal.309  
Finally, as with all other steps examined in the U.S. journey of the Eskridge-
Merin-Waaldijk incrementalism, the arrival of this step with Windsor predominately, 
achieves incrementalism’s projected progress federally—legal recognition of same-
sex marriages. But as progressive as such review of marriage equality is, the Court 
also retained some potential accomplishments yet unfulfilled. For instance, now that 
DOMA’s Section 3 definition of marriage has been invalidated, what about Section 
2’s restrictions, which Windsor did not review? Although the federal government 
must now recognize a valid state-sponsored same-sex marriage under Windsor, that 
recognition does not translate from state to state. Does Section 2 violate the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause? Does it also hinder the patchwork incrementalism and 
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interstate travel? These enquiries have been left untouched by Windsor, saved for 
another confrontation.   
Still, tremendous potency arises in Windsor as the Supreme Court review that 
reaches legal recognition of married same-sex couples. Federally, the marriage 
equality debate in the U.S. has taken the last step within the Eskridge-Merin-
Waaldijk teleology. In invalidating DOMA’s Section 3, Windsor also ended a 
federal method of regulating the expression of sexual identity through coupling 
behavior and signals a moment in which antigay essentialism, which had propelled 
DOMA but was found as animus, was abandoned for an approach that de-
emphasizes biology over the commonalities of experience between same-sex and 
different-sex couples. Subsequently, Part IV will examine how Windsor’s use of 
animus from Lawrence and Romer has significance for sexual minority issues going 
forth.   
IV. THE CONVERGENCE OF INCREMENTALISM AND WINDSOR: ANIMUS-FOCUSED 
JURISPRUDENCE 
From Lawrence to Windsor, the incrementalist journey has brought about an 
abandonment in the law of an antigay essentialist approach toward sexual 
orientation. The law is subordinating that approach in gay rights and recognizing 
that, by dealing with how identity expression was regulated by heavy reliance on a 
negative essentialism resulted in marginalizing sexual minorities. But what else is 
the product of this step-by-step transition? Does abandoning this certain kind of 
essentialist approach also mean the law is categorically embracing constructivism? 
Windsor does not suggest this premise. But instead, although antigay essentialism 
was undone, the law was working around the narrow structures that frame—for 
better or worse—our identity politics as it reached toward federal recognition of 
same-sex marriage. This warrants normative commentary. Ultimately, Windsor did 
not replace essentialism with constructivism; it has not taken any heavy sides in that 
murky and often explosive discourse—particularly over sexual orientation, an area 
where the essentialist-versus-constructivist divide has afforded no clear outcome.310 
For now, rather, the law has selected a more functional way of furthering the rights 
of sexual minorities to reflect social trends and legitimacy by resorting to a 
developing body of animus-focused jurisprudence. And its emergence, in 
simultaneous contrast with the abandoning of antigay essentialism, is the resonating 
and peculiar potential borne from the marriage between sexual orientation 
jurisprudence and marriage equality incrementalism. Animus-focused jurisprudence 
offers much in its fitness to deal with equality while keeping antigay essentialism at 
bay. Yet, Windsor has shortcomings. This Part will address both observations.   
                                                                                                                                            
 310 See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism and Constructivism and 
the Politics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1833, 1849 (1993) (“All this discussion aims to 
show that the grand essentialism/constructivism debate is no debate at all. Rather, it represents 
a simple contest of descriptions where the victor turns upon the particular purpose involved. 
To the extent there is a constructivist controversy, it is pitched not on a single battlefield but 
on every particular site where sexual identity is at issue. On some sites, representing some 
purposes, one description will prevail; on other sites, representing other purposes, the other 
will; and on still other sites, like history writing, both descriptions of sexual identity are 
necessary. There is a grand debate only if one demands a single master description of gay 
identity to serve all purposes. But if that is the case, the debate has meaning but no victor. Our 
purposes of description are simply too various and complex for any single description to 
serve.”). 
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A. History, Background, and Suitability 
Animus-focused jurisprudence had its first major Supreme Court encounter with 
sexual orientation in Romer v. Evans, when the Court found that Colorado’s 
Amendment 2 discriminated against sexual minorities because, under rationality 
review, the initiative’s denial of legal protection to sexual minorities could not be 
justified by its specific disapproval of a particular group.311 But the rational basis 
review used there did not altogether resemble the highly deferential rational basis 
review that the Court has applied in other cases, rather this specific species of 
rational basis in Romer was one in which legislative animus was the featured culprit 
behind the irrationality of a law, similar to that found in such cases as Department of 
Agriculture v. Moreno312 and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,313 
cases that invalidated laws that specifically targeted an individual group. Rather than 
entertaining the issue of discrimination against gays under a heightened review that 
suspect or quasi-suspect classifications would warrant, Romer bypassed an analysis 
that would have involved the Court conceptualizing orientation as a protectable 
identity trait under tiered scrutiny for a focus, instead, on the animus behind the 
legislation to invalidate Amendment 2.314 As discussed earlier, Lawrence, although 
not an equal protection case, relied on Romer; subsequently, the pre-2003 DADT 
cases relied on Lawrence; and most recently, Windsor draws from this jurisprudence 
by relying on both Romer and Lawrence to find the animus behind DOMA’s 
promulgation, rendering its definition of marriage unconstitutional.315 Windsor is the 
third Supreme Court case in this line that has used animus in some fashion to address 
a legal marginalization of sexual minorities, which bears significance for both sexual 
orientation jurisprudence and potentially the jurisprudence resolving discriminatory 
practices against other potentially-marginalized identities.  
In lieu of adding sexual orientation as a new suspect class, the move toward an 
enhanced rational basis review (one with “bite” or “teeth”) that offers equal 
protection through a finding of animus makes functional sense. Most glaringly, 
animus and an enhanced rational basis allows the Court to avoid the arduous task of 
articulating just what about sexual orientation would classify it as suspect under the 
traditional tiered scrutiny of equal protection jurisprudence—a classification which 
some have argued has closed since the 1970s.316 For a group to open the doors to that 
classification, the balancing of several factors would favor such classification, 
including (1) the group’s political powerlessness; (2) the group’s history of 
discrimination; (3) immutability of group’s characteristic traits; (4) the connection 
between characteristic and discriminatory legislation.317 Though others believe that 
                                                                                                                                            
 311 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996). 
 312 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 313 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 314 Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35. 
 315 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693-94 (2013). 
 316 See Yoshino, supra note 177, at 757. 
 317 See Suzannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 927 
(2012); see also Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened 
Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1755-56 (1996). 
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sexual orientation should deservedly be included in a class that triggers heightened 
scrutiny,318 developing the case for it under those factors poses challenging 
hurdles.319 For one, under the factor dealing with the political powerlessness of a 
group, the narrowing of history itself to only the very recent decades has shaded the 
argument that gays, of late, have not been as politically powerless of a group, 
ignoring the disproportionately large amount of oppressive time that sexual 
minorities have endured preceding the gay rights movement and continue, in some 
ways, to endure.320 But also hard to surpass is the misunderstanding between the 
biological and the cultural aspects of sexual orientation poses either a threat to 
salient arguments favoring classification or even offer convincing counterarguments 
that undermine the goal of classification.321 As we have seen how essentialism could 
be harnessed to differentiate and then subjugate the power and existence of a 
disfavored group, so can constructivism, on the opposite end, be harnessed, without 
deftness, to articulate that choice that negates immutability. The immutability 
enquiry potentially creates a nature-versus-nurture binary that is both difficult to 
articulate and also easy to distort.322 Although commentators have argued strongly 
                                                                                                                                            
 318 See, e.g., RICHARDS, supra note 143, at 102; see also In Re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 
384, 413 (Cal. 2008). 
 319 See Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45, 76 (1996) 
(“[J]udges might claim it is too difficult to pin anything so concrete as “suspect class” status 
on this murky, contextual, and poorly charted human variation.” (footnote omitted)). 
 320 See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 (7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting suspect 
classification for sexual orientation based partly on finding that “[i]n these times homosexuals 
are proving that they are not without growing political power”). 
 321 See Massaro, supra note 319, at 76 (“A third complication is the so-called 
‘immutability’ question—a question which is not as easily eliminated as some commentators 
hope. Are people ‘born gay,’ as some tentative, emerging scientific data now suggests? Or is 
sexual orientation a chosen or acquired identity? If one can ‘choose’ to hinder the formation of 
an active gay identity or the commission of ‘gay acts,’ then legislation criminalizing or 
otherwise discouraging active gay identities and sexual acts may seem rational. How would 
the courts respond to social constructivist claims that one is not born a homosexual’ but made 
one by historic, economic, political, and social forces—the very forces the law transfixes 
through equal protection law? One judicial response might be to say that the more porous and 
malleable the borders of heterosexuality, the more justifiable is the official policing of those 
borders—at least if one accepts the (still) prevalent view that society should, if possible, 
eradicate homosexuality. Alternatively, a judge could more sympathetically deny gay rights 
by ruling that sexuality is fluid. Not only do political and social factors influence generally the 
formation of sexual identity, but individually, few people are exclusively, saliently or 
consistently ‘heterosexual’ or ‘nonheterosexual.’ Thus, judges might claim it is too difficult to 
pin anything so concrete as ‘suspect clas’ status on this murky, contextual, and poorly charted 
human variation. Even gay rights advocates recognize the dangers of concretizing and 
essentializing the category of nonheterosexuality and potentially denying its fluidity, variety, 
and contextuality. In fact, many advocates of gay rights find this to be one more unacceptable 
double-bind.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 322 See Andrea M. Kimball, Note, Romer v. Evans and Colorado’s Amendment 2: The Gay 
Movement’s Symbolic Victory in the Battle for Civil Rights, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 219, 239 
(1997) (“Currently, the issue of immutability is much like a never-ending nature verses 
nurture debate which makes the equal protection immutability analysis difficult.”); see also 
Alafair S. R. Burke, A Few Straight Men: Homosexuals in the Military and Equal Protection, 
6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 109, 112 (1994) (“[T]he immutability requirement is the most 
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that the binary is simplistically false and demonstrated more lenient arguments for 
establishing immutability,323 the proverbial verdict is still out on the methods to 
harness this factor in determining suspect classification and, for sexual minorities, 
that uncertainty could pose as something either navigable or treacherous in litigation 
where certainty takes a premium. 
Constructivism—although perhaps a more empowering approach to studying and 
comprehending sexual identity sociologically—adds to the difficulties in arguing for 
immutability because it can be manipulated into transforming ideas that deal with the 
cultural, social, and political aspects of one’s sexual identity to sounding as if being 
a sexual minority is a choice. That choice, as many would argue more precisely, is 
not correctly dealing with the cause of sexual orientation, which many would say is 
natural (thus slightly essentialist), but is attributed to how sexual orientation is 
expressed by the individual to reinforce that identity, whether that choice is innate or 
influenced externally.324 In a sense, there is something both mutable and essential 
about orientation.325 As Caren Dubnoff has written,  
[s]exual orientation is likewise a personal attribute that goes beyond 
conduct. One need not hold that sexual orientation is immutable or 
biologically determined to see it as a personal attribute. Moreover, there is 
increasing evidence that supports the view that sexual orientation often 
involves a genetic component. Like religion, it is often a central aspect of 
an individual’s identity and it is more or less permanent.326  
                                                                                                                                            
difficult hurdle to establishing sexual orientation as a quasi-suspect classification. But 
regardless of the outcome of this ‘nature versus nurture’ debate, it is becoming increasingly 
clear that one's sexual orientation (either by environmental influences or by genetic fate) is 
fixed early in life and is unlikely to change.” (footnotes omitted)); Kimberly Richman, Lovers, 
Legal Strangers, and Parents: Negotiating Parental and Sexual Identity in Family Law, 36 
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 285, 298 (2002) (“The familiar ‘nature versus nurture’ debate is politicized 
by the important social and legal consequences its answers have for LGBT communities, 
individuals, and their families. At stake in particular are two widely significant questions: 
first, is homosexuality an ‘immutable trait’ that can be protected as a suspect status under 
equal protection doctrine and civil rights laws; and second, is homosexuality socially learned 
or otherwise communicable.”). 
 323 See, e.g., Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646, 
651-57 (2001). 
 324 See Ortiz, supra note 310, at 1835 (“[Constructivism] is not, as many think, a debate 
even partly about the causes of homosexuality but rather one about the most appropriate 
descriptions of gay identity.”). 
 325 See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the 
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 568 (1994) (“Disaggregating the various 
forms of essentialism and constructivism thus indicates that they are actually intertwined in all 
but the most extreme ends of their own ranges, and offers the possibility of finding a 
conceptual location from which pro-gay essentialists and pro-gay constructivists can frame 
legal arguments that avoid the argument from immutability while not contradicting its 
empirical predicate. Recent sexuality studies in history, anthropology, and cultural studies 
vary more or less continuously in the depth of their claim that sexual-orientation categories 
are socially contingent.”). 
 326 Caren G. Dubnoff, Romer v. Evans: A Legal and Political Analysis, 15 LAW & INEQ. 
275, 310-11 (1997). 
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Dubnoff demonstrates a conceptual reality about sexual identity, analogous with 
race or gender.327 But this notion, which sounds plausible in sociological debates, 
then appear more shaky and subjective in a venue where fact-finding and truth-
seeking places a premium on reaching a higher level of clarity, as truth and fact are 
tied inevitably to rights and remedies.328 Thus, pinning down that something seems 
like a tall order. In some ways, the current pro-gay sociological debates about sexual 
identity do not easily facilitate the establishment of sexual minorities as a suspect 
class.329  
As Janet Halley, who has written extensively on the subtleties of the essentialist-
versus-constructivist dichotomies in sexual orientation,330 has distinctively 
articulated, when arguing from a pro-gay perspective in litigation, a “middle ground” 
should be reached between essentialism and constructivism.331 Thusly,  
sexual orientation, no matter what causes it, acquires social and political 
meaning through the material and symbolic activities of living people. 
This is the arena of representation, the arena in which we signify to one 
another who we are, negotiate the norms attaching to that, and arrange 
and rearrange power along the sexual orientation hierarchy.332  
Within tiered scrutiny and establishing suspect classification, this articulation 
bears worth. Despite robust reliance by courts, academic critics have observed tiered 
scrutiny’s frailties.333 The criticisms deal mostly with tiered scrutiny’s ability to be 
workable with “real world” issues of diversity that may not be captured by the levels 
of classifications,334 with tiered scrutiny’s adherence to “big picture” generalizations 
                                                                                                                                            
 327 Id. See generally Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA 
L. REV. 1467 (2000); Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for 
Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001). 
 328 See Halley, supra note 325, at 528 (“Pro-gay litigation has a number of important 
objectives. It seeks concrete remedies for plaintiffs who have been materially harmed by anti-
gay discrimination. . . . More broadly, it seeks to establish rules of law that will benefit gay 
men, lesbians, and bisexuals (and, it is to be hoped, other subordinated groups as well), either 
in subsequent litigation or through the gradual and mysterious processes by which legal rules 
shape public and private norms.”). 
 329 Corrine Blacklock, Comment, Hollingsworth v. Perry: Expressive Harm and the Stakes 
of “Marriage”, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 217, 237 (2013) (“Part of the 
reason the [Supreme] Court has never explicitly announced a heightened standard may be that 
gays and lesbians do not fit neatly within the equal protection ‘suspect class’ criteria.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 330 Halley, supra note 325. 
 331 Id. at 568. 
 332 Id. at 506. 
 333 See e.g., Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified: Justice John Paul Stevens 
and the Case for Unmediated Constitutional Protection, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339, 2342-45 
(2006). 
 334 See Pollvogt, supra note 317, at 897 (“[T]he tiers-of-scrutiny framework operates as an 
outcome matrix, thereby short-circuiting rather than deepening substantive inquiry into the 
fairness of any particular form of discrimination. And indeed, one sees a pattern in equal 
protection decisions where much time and attention is paid to determining the applicable level 
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that create rigid incongruences when issues are examined more subtly,335 and with 
tiered scrutiny’s adequate fulfillment of the goals of equal protection.336 If those 
problems do precisely plague the tiered scrutiny setup, then perhaps arguing 
specificity too readily from one end of the binary—whether nature or nurture, 
essentialist or constructivist—ventures against such problems and creates an 
artificial hurdle to achieving equality for sexual minorities. In this fashion, extending 
Halley’s view, perhaps the answer for sexual minorities lies not within identity 
politics and theory, but within middle grounds and commonalities of human 
experiences as well. As Halley puts it, “[l]itigating on common ground is thus not 
only the right thing to do—it is also more likely to work.”337  
In contrast to heightened scrutiny, the animus-focused, enhanced rational basis 
alternative that the Supreme Court has used to deal with legal issues involving 
sexual orientation—e.g., discrimination, privacy, marriage equality—has focused, 
without getting to the essentialist-versus-constructivist debate over sexual 
orientation, on commonalities of human experience and the violation of that 
commonality for a group through biases that formulate discrimination. Finding 
animus is helpful in this way because the judicial investigation focuses less on 
sociological debates about identity and reaches more toward the invidious reasons 
behind a piece of legislation. In theorizing the origins of animus-focused 
jurisprudence used in Romer, Akhil Amar has made its connection, not to any 
doctrine that raises identity politics, but instead to the Attainder Clause338 and argues 
that Romer’s use of animus allowed the issue to be rephrased not to read “whether 
sexual orientation can be treated differently (from, say, race); but whether gays and 
bis can be treated differently (from straights).”339 Suzanne Pollvogt similarly 
observes this doctrinal focus of animus by remarking that “the doctrine of 
unconstitutional animus expresses core values of the federal Equal Protection Clause 
that transcend the Court's rigid tiers-of-scrutiny framework.”340 This emphasis is 
facially and particularly noticeable in Kennedy’s framing of these issues in Romer in 
terms of the protection that Amendment 2 denied sexual minorities and particularly 
how Amendment 2 stands incompatible to our broad principles of access to justice: 
                                                                                                                                            
of judicial scrutiny; once this question is answered, the analysis proceeds succinctly and 
superficially. If the Court rejects arguments that the plaintiff is a member of a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class, or that the law interferes with a fundamental right, it will settle on rational 
basis review and the plaintiff will lose. But if the Court is persuaded of either of these two 
prerequisites, it will apply heightened scrutiny and likely strike the challenged law.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 335 See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 203, 204–05 (1996) (noticing the Supreme Court makes the distinction that sex 
discrimination triggers intermediate scrutiny but race receives strict scrutiny). 
 336 Siegel, supra note 333, at 2344-45 (“Finally, and I would argue most importantly, 
critics of tiered scrutiny have argued that the doctrine fails to adequately capture the 
normative content of the Equal Protection Clause.” (footnote omitted)). 
 337 See Halley, supra note 325, at 567. 
 338 See generally Amar, supra note 335, at 203. 
 339 Id. at 224. 
 340 Pollvogt, supra note 317, at 892. 
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“It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort. Central to both 
the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee of equal 
protection is the principle that government and each of its parts remain open and 
impartial to all who seek its assistance.”341 In Romer, animus-focused rationality 
review allowed the Court to bypass the task of suspect classification of gays in a 
trade-off that permitted the Court to reach more directly and readily for the focus on 
what lies behind legislative discrimination that hindered “respect for other citizens’ 
freedom of association”342—in other words, a protectable commonality of 
experience. Animus-focused jurisprudence can “embody a move to a more objective 
approach to meaning, and thus one closer to social meaning”343 that brings about 
common ground and makes this kind of review more functional for litigating 
discrimination against sexual minorities in light of the difficulties of suspect 
classification. For if Richard Posner is correct that “[s]exuality is the 
multidisciplinary subject par excellence,”344 then a jurisprudence that stares directly 
toward the invidiousness threatening the dignity of sexual minorities suggests a more 
functional way of reparation than trying to explaining why sexual orientation, with 
all of its complexities, should be afforded heightened scrutiny before applying that 
review.   
B. Windsor’s Appeal 
In restricting DOMA from “diminishing the stability and predictability of basic 
personal relations the State has found it proper to acknowledge and protect”345—
another commonality of human experience—Windsor, as the latest incrementalist 
step, had the ability to solidify animus-focused jurisprudence for sexual minorities 
more effectively than its predecessor cases, Romer and Lawrence, and other recent 
significant steps for LGBT equality, such as the DADT repeal. Windsor bodes much 
for the development of animus-focused jurisprudence in gay rights litigation, 
because in contrast to Romer and Lawrence, the 2013 decision had the least 
encumbrance in applying such review. Windsor is both the last step federally in the 
marriage equality incrementalism theorized by Eskridge, Merin, and Waaldijk, while 
being a major Supreme Court case to review marriage equality using animus. The 
confluence between incrementalism and marriage equality has brought about a case 
that utilizes legislative animus to overcome sexual minority inequality in a more 
prominent and unfettered way than other preceding moments.  
With Romer, Pollvogt has mentioned in her study on animus that although the 
1996 Supreme Court decision was the first in the line of cases to use animus-focused 
rationality to specifically address discrimination against sexual minorities, Romer 
also had to co-exist with Supreme Court precedent in Bowers.346 At the time, it was 
debatable whether Romer overturned Bowers.347 And in light of that legal 
                                                                                                                                            
 341 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). 
 342 Id. 
 343 Blacklock, supra note 329, at 244. 
 344 RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 36 (1992). 
 345 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013). 
 346 See Pollvogt, supra note 317, at 911. 
 347 Id. 
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uncertainty until Lawrence, the reach of animus-focused jurisprudence in Romer had 
to be reconciled with Bowers, or at least that precedent stood in more of a state of 
limbo until Lawrence and now Windsor.348  
Similarly, animus was part of Lawrence’s rationale in finding just how “wrong” 
the Bowers decision was in validating anti-sodomy laws in 1986.349 Lawrence’s 
doctrinal focus on animus was not an act culled from a vacuum, but had extended 
from Romer’s influence.350 Although not distinctly an equal protection case, but 
carrying with it some overtones of equality, Lawrence utilized animus in its due 
process analysis to show how conduct—sodomy—was used to criminalize 
consenting same-sex adults engaging in sex that could, but not always, indicate 
sexual orientation.351 Pollvogt has noted that  
the real focus of Lawrence was to reject differential treatment based on 
sexual orientation. Lawrence addressed whether a state could criminalize 
homosexual sodomy that took place in private between consenting adults. 
There was no question that the animating spirit of the law was bare moral 
disapproval of homosexual conduct and identity. The question was 
whether such disapproval was a permissible basis for legislation. The 
Court held that it was not.352  
In a specific passage of Lawrence, Kennedy implicitly characterized that 
disapproval behind anti-sodomy laws by calling into question much of Bowers’ 
historical recitation over how traditional and how fixed anti-sodomy laws stood for 
singling out sexual minorities:  
Despite the absence of prosecutions, there may have been periods in which there 
was public criticism of homosexuals as such and an insistence that the criminal laws 
be enforced to discourage their practices. But far from possessing ‘ancient roots,’ 
American laws targeting same-sex couples did not develop until the last third of the 
20th century.353 
Rather than approbation for gays, Kennedy relayed that such laws actually 
represented efforts to curb non-procreative sex generally.354 Kennedy’s correction of 
Bowers here would suggest that the moral approbation toward sexual minorities that 
the Bowers majority had assembled falsely to justify anti-sodomy laws was, in fact, a 
kind of irrational animus.  
After finding such animus, Kennedy enquired “whether the majority may use the 
power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of 
the criminal law. ‘Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our 
                                                                                                                                            
 348 See id. at 891. 
 349 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574-75 (2003) (finding that the Texas anti-
sodomy law was based on animus in overruling Bowers). 
 350 Id. at 574 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)). 
 351 See Anthony Michael Kreis, Lawrence Meets Libel: Squaring Constitutional Norms 
with Sexual-Orientation Defamation, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 125, 137 (2012), http:// 
yalelawjournal.org/2012/11/12/kreis.html. 
 352 Pollvogt, supra note 317, at 921 (footnotes omitted). 
 353 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570 (citations omitted). 
 354 Id. 
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own moral code.’ ”355 Kennedy saw that the animus behind the criminalization of 
conduct that might be particularized against sexual minorities was both by a private 
majority and veiled behind public laws.356 Without mentioning it, Kennedy seemed 
to invoke an animus-focused reasoning to overturn Bowers because he found that the 
purpose of denying commonality of human experience led to violating personal 
dignity. He reached for that commonality explicitly in Lawrence through Romer and 
posited that “Romer invalidated an amendment to Colorado’s Constitution which 
named as a solitary class persons who were homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexual either 
by ‘orientation, conduct, practices or relationships,’ and deprived them of protection 
under state antidiscrimination laws.”357 He articulated that specifically “[w]e 
concluded that the provision [in Romer] was ‘born of animosity toward the class of 
persons affected’ and further that it had no rational relation to a legitimate 
governmental purpose.”358 Likewise then, in Lawrence, Kennedy similarly remarked 
that anti-sodomy laws borne out of animosity toward sexual minorities “demeans the 
lives of homosexual persons”359 and deprived rights that led to a loss of personal 
dignity with universal application.360    
 However, Lawrence’s muted use of animus makes it hard to place it on par with 
Windsor’s direct application of animus in an equal protection case. Even in its 
muddled state between due process and equal protection, Lawrence has less direct 
bearing as an alternative for classifying sexual minorities as suspect for heightened 
scrutiny in equal protection.361 But the majority’s use of animus in a due process 
case such as Lawrence does demonstrate the versatility of animus not only for laws 
that discriminate based on traits but also for laws against conduct—as the difference 
in analysis between an equal protection and a due process review in Lawrence 
amounted to the difference between evaluating the anti-sodomy laws based on how it 
regulated sodomy by identity (equal protection) or by conduct (due process).362 
                                                                                                                                            
 355 Id. at 571 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)). 
 356 Id. at 569-70. 
 357 Id. at 574. 
 358 Id.  
 359 Id.  
 360 See id. at 578.  
 361 See generally id. at 562-79. Even though the majority opinion does recount one of the 
issues on appeal as “[w]hether petitioners' criminal convictions under the Texas ‘Homosexual 
Conduct’ law—which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical 
behavior by different-sex couples—violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal 
protection of the laws,” id. at 564, Lawrence’s resolution does not address equal protection or 
suspect classification issues. In fact, Justice Kennedy alludes to the avoidance of equal 
protection jurisprudence when he claims that the majority ruling Lawrence “does not involve 
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual 
persons seek to enter.” Id. at 578.   
 362 See, e.g., id. (Justice Kennedy concurs with Justice Steven’s dissent in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, particularly with the passage that references animus in the way that “‘the fact that 
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is 
not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice,’” id. (citing Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)), before Justice Kennedy 
reiterates his resolution of Lawrence under due process by stating that Lawrence does not 
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Animus-focused jurisprudence would address discrimination of laws that burden 
protectable conduct as a pretext to marginalizing a certain group. These were the 
larger implications for animus existing nascent in Lawrence. Windsor, as an equal 
protection case couched within Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, stands bookended 
with Romer but it also builds on Lawrence’s use of animus to extend that notion of a 
protected commonality. Citing Lawrence, Kennedy used protected consensual sexual 
intimacy to establish “‘a personal bond that is more enduring.’”363 Kennedy moved 
on to depict that bond as something that the state of New York was justified in 
recognizing legalizing same-sex marriages,364 and that DOMA took this recognition 
away based on moral disapproval.365  
Windsor is also superior for the rearing of animus-focused jurisprudence than its 
sister event of incrementalism, the repeal of DADT. For creating case law, the 
congressional repeal lacked such direct opportunity. Additionally, the doctrinal 
uncertainty after Lawrence did not successfully influence post-Lawrence, pre-DADT 
repeal cases from uniformly applying animus-focused jurisprudence. Those cases 
were scattered. Although Cook and Witt both distilled from Lawrence a higher 
standard of review than traditional rationality, the cases were not able to apply 
animus-focused jurisprudence effectively in the face of military deference.366 This 
ceiling for animus is a shortcoming, but only so in the confines of litigation against 
military deference—an exceptional situation outside the usual realms of civilian 
American life and experience.367 Log Cabin Republicans later used a heightened 
scrutiny to reach its conclusion that DADT was unconstitutional.368 Although Robert 
                                                                                                                                            
involve status or “formal recognition of any relationship that homoosexual persons seek to 
enter,” id., but rather conduct or “sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle,” id., that 
the Due Process Clause protects).   
 363 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
567). 
 364 Id. at 2693.  
 365 Id. “The House concluded that DOMA expresses ‘both moral disapproval of 
homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional 
(especially Judeo-Christian) morality.’” Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-664 at 16). “The 
differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution 
protects.” Id. (citing generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558). 
 366 Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 56 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding that “Lawrence is, in our view, 
another in this line of Supreme Court authority that identifies a protected liberty interest and 
then applies a standard of review that lies between strict scrutiny and rational basis” before 
applying it to plaintiff’s facial constitutional challenges to DADT); Witt v. Dep’t of the Air 
Force, 527 F.3d 806, 816 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We cannot reconcile what the Supreme Court did 
in Lawrence with the minimal protections afforded by traditional rational basis review.”). 
 367 See Ellen Oberwetter, Rethinking Military Deference: Male-Only Draft Registration 
and the Intersection of Military Need with Civilian Rights, 78 TEX. L. REV. 173, 181 (1999) 
(“The varying rationales for upholding Congress's authority to implement military policies in 
tension with constitutional rights include the arguments that (1) Congress's military authority 
is plenary and not subject to review, (2) the Court lacks the competence to review complex 
military matters, and (3) the military is a separate society, the regulation of which is without 
analogy in the civilian sector.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)). 
 368 Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 911 (C.D. Cal 2010), 
vacated, 658 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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Correales believes that DADT litigants can now theoretically rely on animus-focused 
jurisprudence in cases seeking remedial reparation for harm suffered as a result of 
DADT discrimination,369 at the time before the repeal, his thoughts on animus-
focused jurisprudence remained much more theoretical as Lawrence’s use of animus 
successfully addressed the decriminalization of consensual same-sex intimacy was 
conversely difficult for courts to interpret and apply.  
Henceforth, the arrival of Windsor as yet another gay rights case applying 
animus-focused, rationality review but this time as the last step within marriage 
equality incrementalism rears this jurisprudence for sexual minorities from infancy 
to pre-adolescence. First, as marriage equality cases have proceeded in lower state 
and federal courts in the interim between Lawrence and Windsor, several notable 
lower court decisions that have applied animus-focused jurisprudence successfully 
for legal recognition of marriage to same-sex couples, setting the stage for Supreme 
Court weigh-in.370 Most prominently a few challenges to Section 3 of DOMA in 
federal courts viewed the definition unconstitutional under rationality approach,371 
but also other cases challenging traditional marriages such as Goodridge relied on 
rationality and so did Perry v. Schwartzenegger.372 In fact, it could be that the 
Supreme Court’s use of animus and rational basis review will exist quite definitively 
in the marriage equality arena for some time, as the adopted standard could clarify 
challenges in state and federal courts. Certainly, a status that officially triggers 
heightened scrutiny would be ideal because of its traditional protections. 
Nevertheless, in that possible interim toward suspect or quasi-suspect, an enhanced 
rational basis review with its teeth on animus could suffice.  
Windsor also harnessed animus-focused jurisprudence in an era much less 
antagonistic toward sexual minorities. Unlike Lawrence and Romer, the Supreme 
Court applied animus-focused jurisprudence in a more favorable social climate for 
sexual minorities.373 Part of this transformation is marriage equality incrementalism; 
the necessary steps have begun to draw favor upon sexual minorities gradually, with 
each ascending moment adding upon the next. But it has partly also been attributed 
to the visibility of sexual minorities in present culture and also the changing public 
attitudes toward LGBT rights—particularly with younger constituencies.374 The 
                                                                                                                                            
 369 See Robert I. Correales, Unfinished Business: A Discussion of Remedies for Victims of 
Involuntary Dismissal Under Don't Ask, Don’t Tell and Its Predecessor, Toward A True 
Reconciliation, 22 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 22 (2012) (referencing Robert I. Correales, 
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: A Dying Policy, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 413, 415 (2008)). 
 370 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 682 F.3d 1, 10 (1st 
Cir. 2012); Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 335-40 (D. Conn. 
2012); Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 872 F. Supp. 2d 944, 959 (N.D. Cal. 2012); 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 371 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d at 10; Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 
2d at 335-40; Dragovich, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 959. 
 372 See generally Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941. 
 373 See Gay Marriage: Key Data Points from Pew Research, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 
11, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/key-data-points/gay-marriage-key-data-points-from-
pew-research. 
 374 See Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, supra note 11. 
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positioning of animus-focused jurisprudence in Windsor amidst the backdrop of 
rising social approval might prove interesting contrast for spotlighting that much 
more dramatically and effectively the historical hatred and moral disapproval toward 
sexual minorities.  
And third, through animus-focused enquiry, Windsor, reinforced the significant 
rights dealing with commonalities of human experience that were set up earlier in 
Romer and Lawrence, creating a more concrete case law in this area. Like Romer, 
Windsor bypassed suspect classification by reaching toward animus to spot the 
irrational deprivation of equal protection of laws against sexual minorities.375 Romer 
found that “[r]espect for this principle explains why laws singling out a certain class 
of citizens for disfavored legal state or general hardships are rare”376 and that “laws 
of this kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage 
imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affect.”377 Windsor copied 
this review by finding that “DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of state-
sanctioned marriages and make them unequal”378 and that the basis for this is the 
animus when “[t]he House concluded that DOMA expresses ‘both moral disapproval 
of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with 
traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality.”379 It also reaffirmed a bit of the 
mystery in litigating and reaching the finding of animus as Windsor relied on 
Romer’s technique of inferring animus from Colorado’s Amendment 2: “In 
determining whether a law is motivated by an improper animus or purpose, 
‘“‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character’”’ especially require careful 
consideration.”380 Romer started with these unusual discriminations in Amendment 
2—that deprived sexual minorities legal protection in Colorado—and found it 
created the irrationality that up-ended Amendment 2 constitutionally.381 According 
to Pollvogt, this type of inference is both different from the enquiry used in Cleburne 
and was a product of Romer’s muted reconciliation with Bowers’ existence at the 
time.382 Cleburne used, what Pollovogt described, as inferring animus from 
examining “the structure of the law” in question and seeking whether there was a 
“logical connection” between the trait that those arguing discrimination inhabited 
and any governmental interest in that legislation.”383 Romer, conversely, found that 
“Amendment 2 must be based in animus because there was a radical lack of fit 
between the laws means and ends.”384 Interestingly, the easiest way to infer animus 
                                                                                                                                            
 375 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). 
 376 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). 
 377 Id. at 634. 
 378 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
 379 Id. at 2693 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, 12-13 (1996)). 
 380 Id. at 2692 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (citations omitted)). 
 381 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (“It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of 
this sort.”). 
 382 Pollvogt, supra note 317, at 927-28. 
 383 Id. at 927. 
 384 Id. at 928. 
66https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol62/iss1/4
2014] WEATHER PERMITTING 67 
 
would be to look textually at “the direct evidence of private bias as the impetus 
behind adopting a law”385 which include “[s]uch statements may be made by 
legislators or private individuals and may express any number of sentiments that 
shed light on the true function of the law: a mere recognition of the existence of 
private bias; an expression of bare moral disapproval; and/or statements of stereotype 
or fear.”386 This method would have been most readily available based on the ample 
legislative record. But Kennedy decided to save that as his second line of enquiry, as 
if nearing the means and ends analysis of the Section 3 through its discrimination 
toward same-sex couples would substantiate the more textual analysis behind 
DOMA. He proceeded first by making that means and ends inference of animus:  
DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and 
accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to deprive same-sex 
couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal 
recognition of their marriages. This is strong evidence of a law having the 
purpose and effect of disapproval of that class. The avowed purpose and 
practical effect of the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a 
separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex 
marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.387  
Only after this enquiry, did Kennedy then draw animus separately from looking 
at how “[t]he history of DOMA’s enactment and its own text demonstrate that 
interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages”388 and examine the House 
report for moral disapproval.389 Kennedy’s arrangement here highlights this more 
liberal method of inferring animus based on discriminations of unusual character 
posed against unifying constitutional principles of equal protection rather than 
Cleburne’s method which focuses the investigation back onto classifications. 
But Windsor’s adoption of Romer for inferring animus gets us only half-way. We 
must also examine how its application reaches a focus on commonality rather than 
distinctions that reflect social and cultural pluralism. The finding of animus is 
inversely connected with deprivations that lead to violating human dignity, and this 
is where Lawrence enters, as both Windsor and Lawrence are Supreme Court 
decisions heavily framed in dignity rights.390 By finding that anti-sodomy laws 
violated some kind of protectable privacy right, Kennedy’s majority opinion in 
Lawrence then draws the link between violation of privacy to infringement of human 
dignity.391 Bowers and its validation of anti-sodomy laws “as precedent demeans the 
                                                                                                                                            
 385 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 386 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 387 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 388 Id. at 927. 
 389 Id. 
 390 See id.; accord Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (“The central holding 
of Bowers has been brought in question by this case, and it should be addressed. Its 
continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”). 
 391 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (“If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which 
does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it 
were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons. When homosexual conduct is 
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lives of homosexual persons.”392 Beyond the misdemeanor triggered by violating the 
statute in Texas,393 the stigma of the statute resonates toward an encroachment upon 
what Kennedy believed the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution afforded.394 
According to Glensy, Lawrence could have “focus[ed] on a possibly narrower ruling 
by linking the violation to an intrusion on one's privacy,”395 but instead the majority 
“opted for a broader statement, by declaring that the accused statute infringed upon a 
liberty interest that involved ‘the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,’ which are key 
to the protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.”396 Kennedy was not 
ready to just let go of the opinion on narrower grounds but connected the criminal 
stigma of the Texas anti-sodomy law to an “offense with all that imports of the 
dignity of the persons charged.”397 A decade later, it helped that Kennedy penned the 
Windsor majority because it seems as if with DOMA, he picked up where he had 
figuratively left off in Lawrence. Again, with the rights of sexual minorities, 
Kennedy has moved toward a jurisprudence that seemingly shifts away from the 
categories that outline traditional tiered-scrutiny, and with the help of inferring 
animus, he magnified the inequality of Section 3 to common, but universal 
conditions. He did this by again, as in Lawrence, calling out that the result of 
DOMA, like the Texas sodomy statute, “demeans the couple, whose moral and 
sexual choices the Constitution protects [citing Lawrence] and whose relationship 
the State has sought to dignify.”398 From this vantage point, the difference is subtle 
as DOMA was decided partially on federalism grounds and Kennedy couched the 
infringement caused as an unconstitutional interference upon the right of New York 
“to acknowledge a status the State finds to dignified and proper[.]”399 Windsor, like 
Lawrence, are cases where the majority facilitated the links between the experiences 
of sexual orientation to commonalities of human experience by inversely targeting 
the animus lurking with the law and blocking full access to that commonality and 
distorted personal dignity. From there, we arrive at uncovering discrimination 
without singling out sexual minorities for qualifying under tiered scrutiny.400 This 
developing jurisprudence bears potential for sexual minorities federally.  
                                                                                                                                            
made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to 
subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”). 
 392 Id. 
 393 Id. 
 394 Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).  
 395 Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 91 (2011).  
 396 Id. at 90 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574). 
 397 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. 
 398 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013). 
 399 Id. at 2696. 
 400 See id.  
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C. Stepping Forth from Windsor’s Shortcomings 
As far as full gratification is concerned, however, Windsor is also decidedly 
deceptive. Alas, so far the conceit of Part IV has been to highlight the dynamic 
potential in Windsor’s furtherance of animus-focused jurisprudence. But there are 
serious boundaries that limit Windsor’s step toward a fuller sense of common ground 
and equality for sexual minorities, leaving Windsor’s doctrinal reach with animus-
jurisprudence this time not as far as it could have been.  
In Windsor, the Court did seem to endorse that abandonment of antigay 
essentialism as its interpretation of the House report and its finding upon the reasons 
behind DOMA—in particular, disapproval of gays—echoed that of Lawrence and 
Romer. But the inverse is not as bold. The focus on the bond of marriage, rather than 
biology, did not appear as personally tied to the Court when one places Windsor’s 
recognition of same-sex marriage in a tautology encased in the federalism aspects of 
the case—that DOMA intruded upon New York state’s regulation of marriage within 
its borders and upon the equal protection that the Fifth Amendment has been 
interpreted to hold.401 Windsor, in its broadest sense with DOMA, is about 
congressional intrusion into state sovereignty. So in order to find that New York 
State’s ability to regulate marriage was violated by federal law, the Court had to 
rationalize how that occurred by drawing up New York’s recognition of same-sex 
marriage, which seemed to resonate with a broader sense of marriage than what 
DOMA had essentialized in 1996.402 It appears then that the Court’s recognition of 
same-sex relationships in marriage was ultimately through the lens of New York law 
and through not its own. 
In overturning DOMA based on federalism principles, the Windsor Court 
condoned the prerogatives of the state—any state in fact—that would have done 
what New York did, which was to recognize the bond and commonalities of 
experience that same-sex couples deserved within the legal protections of state-
regulated marriage, and that the antigay essentialism that Congress harnessed to draft 
and pass DOMA was the animus that resulted in Section 3’s inference with New 
York’s prerogatives—thus, making Section 3 irrational.403 The Court stood behind 
federalism and the Fifth Amendment to make that positive assessment of same-sex 
marriage and commonality, of bond over biology. And likely, as Chief Justice 
Roberts’ dissent contended, Windsor would also honor a state’s refusal to recognize 
same-sex couples in marriage.404 Although animus-jurisprudence has the ability to 
spotlight commonalities of human experience as it feeds into a more robust and 
modern view of marriage, the Court did not use it directly to express its own views 
of marriage in Windsor, rather the majority expressed justification for New York 
                                                                                                                                            
 401 Id. at 2692.  
 402 Id. 
 403 Id. at 2695 (“What has been explained to this point should more than suffice to establish 
that the principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law are to demean those persons 
who are in a lawful same-sex marriage. This requires the Court to hold, as it now does, that 
DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth 
Amendment of the Constitution.”). 
 404 Id. at 2696. 
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State to construct marriage the way it does without federal intervention.405 If this was 
an endorsement of same-sex marriage, it was a subtle one.   
Perhaps this is incrementalism at play here—small steps again. With all the 
potential that could be harnessed by animus-focused jurisprudence, the law 
maintains gradual baby steps toward that goal. If that is the case and if the 
underlying normative response is that sexual identity is important enough for 
constitutional legal protection and recognition, then the question regards how the law 
should retain and recapitulate animus-focused jurisprudence for that purpose going 
forth. In the immediate aftermath of Windsor, two areas unresolved by the opinion, 
more or less on state levels, might help strengthen animus-jurisprudence for fully 
recognizing marriage equality and issues surrounding sexual orientation in the 
future.  
First, even if the Court was shielded behind the Fifth Amendment in Windsor, its 
use of animus-focused jurisprudence has unleashed a rudimentary blueprint for 
sexual minorities with desire to combat the 36 mini-DOMAs that exist across the 
states defining marriage as different-sex.406 To extend this idea, where 
constitutionally permitted, litigants should use animus-focused rationality and 
emulate, from Windsor’s lead, similar types of antigay essentialism that reveal biases 
toward a group that could deem a discriminatory law irrational. Although Roberts in 
his dissent in Windsor believed that “those statute-specific considerations [of animus 
in DOMA] will, of course, be irrelevant in future cases about different statutes,”407 
future cases should rely on Windsor, at least, for a path for finding animus perhaps in 
other state-enacted DOMAs. Justice Scalia’s strikingly reactive tone toward the 
majority’s opinion seemed to reflect a less tempered view than Roberts’. Both 
Justices vary in their degrees of urgency toward the majority’s delineation of New 
York’s marriage laws—favorable to same-sex couples—in overturning DOMA. 
Roberts tried emphatically to remind the public that Windsor was ruled on the 
narrower grounds of federalism,408 while Scalia attempted with several examples to 
illustrate “[h]ow easy, indeed how inevitable, to reach the [majority’s] same 
conclusion with regard to state laws denying same-sex couples marital status.”409 
With Lawrence, Scalia’s dissenting forecast that decriminalized sodomy would lead 
to aid expansion of marriage for same-sex couples was realized in Windsor.410 Adam 
Liptak has characterized it as “Justice Scalia’s sky-is-falling approach,”411 and 
                                                                                                                                            
 405 See e.g., id. at 2692 (“[T]he States decision to give this class of persons the right to 
marry, conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import.  When the State used its 
historic and essential authority to define the marital relation in this way, its role and its power 
in making the decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, and protection of the class in their 
own community. DOMA, because of its reach and extent, departs from this history and 
tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage.”). 
 406 See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATE MARRIAGE LAWS AND BANS (2012), available at 
http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/StateMarriageLaws_Bans.pdf. 
 407 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 408 Id. 
 409 Id.  
 410 Id.  
 411 ADAM LIPTAK, TO HAVE AND UPHOLD: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE BATTLE FOR 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (Kindle ed. 2013). 
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similarly here, Scalia might be correct in sensing that a Windsor strategy bears 
potential here for a gathering litigation storm over mini-DOMA’s, while Roberts’ 
downplaying might be a strategy in it of itself of acknowledging the same. The 
animus-focused jurisprudence in Windsor could help lead those charges on the state 
level.  
This potential testing of animus-focused jurisprudence would veritably utilize 
patchwork incrementalism to fulfill a strengthening of the doctrine. If state litigants 
do progress down this path, then it would be wise to stick to using Windsor and 
Romer-type enquiry, but also add to the doctrine by what Pollvogt found in Cleburne 
was a focus on the structure of the discriminatory law to infer animus.412 The focus 
would be, again, urged upon discrimination—inferring animus through perhaps other 
examples of antigay essentialism or otherwise—building out this particular doctrine 
in the realm of sexual orientation. In addition, the focus on animus should also 
uncover infringement of normatively-protected commonalities of human experiences 
as well to weaken a federalism approach from Windsor that states might use to 
uphold refusal to recognize same-sex marriage. This connection might be guided 
particularly by Lawrence and Windsor’s venture into dignity and the rights, as 
couched by Kennedy, that follow accordingly from the Constitution. As a strategy, 
this focus would also oppose the “stabilizing prudence” arguments that Scalia tries to 
reinforce as a way to de-emphasize any sort of legislative animus,413 and instead ease 
into inferring animus more readily. An example from Windsor would be how 
DOMA’s federal exclusion of marriage shamed not only married same-sex couples 
in New York but also their children.414  
Secondly, the other litigation where animus-focused jurisprudence might arise is 
within Section 2 of DOMA—an issue that Scalia conspicuously raises was amiss in 
Windsor415—which allow states to not recognize same-sex marriages from other 
states. According to Steve Sanders, 
like DOMA’s Section 3, the discrimination legitimized by Section 2 and 
practiced by the majority of states is of an ‘unusual character.’ All states 
currently recognize the vast majority of marriages celebrated in other 
states, not as a constitutional requirement (the conventional wisdom is 
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause doesn’t apply here) but as a matter of 
comity and common sense. Accordingly individual states have long 
recognized marriages—common-law, first-cousin, even uncle-niece—that 
they themselves would not have created.416 
If litigants do not press for equal recognition, this continued practice of Section 2 
would again segregate different-sex and same-sex marriages for disproportionate 
significance, leading to a lowered status in the eyes of the law if same-sex marriages 
                                                                                                                                            
 412 See id.; see also Pollvogt, supra note 317, at 927-28. 
 413 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 414 Id. at 2694 (majority opinion). 
 415 Id. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 416 Steve Sanders, Next on the Agenda for Marriage Equality Litigators…, SCOTUSBLOG 
(June 26, 2013, 05:40 PM EST), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/next-on-the-agenda-for-
marriage-equality-litigators/. 
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that are valid in one state are not so in another. Litigants could rely on animus-
focused jurisprudence in future Supreme Court confrontations—especially if 
litigants can characterize, as Sanders does, the discrimination in Section 2 as that of 
an “unusual character,” which for Kennedy in both Windsor and Romer trigger 
reliance on enhanced rationality review.417   
With opportunity, distinct determination, and careful litigation, animus-focused 
jurisprudence, if strengthened, could have an effective longevity for equality rights 
in the sexual orientation arena. Although muted in application by the Fifth 
Amendment, Windsor affords a sketch of the further possibilities of this type of 
doctrine forged from previous gay rights cases at the Supreme Court. Windsor’s use 
of animus-focused jurisprudence creates an important endorsement of this type of 
review because further implications and possibilities could lie in the rearing of 
animus-focused jurisprudence into substantial doctrinal maturity with more 
discriminatory issues litigated thusly. In drawing this Article’s normative response to 
Windsor to an end, three larger future end-result possibilities could be fulfilled by 
animus-focused jurisprudence that warrants its positive legal development. First, 
animus-focused jurisprudence could be subsumed into traditional tiered scrutiny by 
affirming notions of a sliding scale approach to tiered scrutiny that have been 
advocated by previous Supreme Court cases.418 Perhaps doing so might have 
potential to create heightened review especially for sexual orientation discrimination 
cases. Although narrow, this result would be desirable as an alternative to quasi-
suspect or suspect classifications without the trappings of officially proving them up. 
This result would reflect again the functionality of animus-focused jurisprudence. 
But the danger here is that what is not officially a suspect class may never be 
accorded similar regard. So even more appropriately as a second possibility, animus-
focused jurisprudence might finally allow articulation of sexual orientation to 
become a quasi-suspect or suspect classification in traditional tiered scrutiny itself. 
An abundance of enhanced rationality review cases for sexual orientation 
discrimination in the future might assert a call for clarity or revisiting of 
classifications that officially trigger heightened scrutiny, instead of having a 
“putative” classification reserved for sexual orientation. This result would bring 
consistency—though it would be consistency in a system of review profoundly 
unsuited against present-world expectations of pluralism.  
And thirdly, stretching that sentiment regarding tiered scrutiny further, animus-
focused jurisprudence could reform tiered scrutiny in the long run, if such cases in 
the aggregate reveal the rigidity of a more formalist tiered scrutiny within an age 
where the discourse on identity politics in fields outside of law seem distant to the 
review the Supreme Court has relied on since the middle of the last century over the 
same subject matter. The current era is embracing a more postmodern sensibility of 
identity with an approach toward cultural distinction and pluralism that does not 
necessarily comport with the existing legal framework created after the era of U.S. v. 
Carolene Products, Co.419 and the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s. 
                                                                                                                                            
 417 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). 
 418 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring); Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
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As examined above, some have argued this shift has awakened cultural sensitivities 
more profoundly and relegated the venerable but entrenched approach to equal 
protection jurisprudence into an anachronistic quandary. With this result, where 
animus-focused jurisprudence might eventually take equality rights cases into a 
realm previously unseen, the dynamics are less predictively defined for now. Likely, 
it would, again, take steps, but the promise of making discrimination and bias against 
a particular group more vividly in the law, and examining its invidiousness toward 
commonalities of experience and dignity, in order to eradicate its propensity, should 
be stressed continually.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The NOM video was absolutely correct to proclaim that something in the debate 
exists far beyond marriage equality advocacy. Its approach, however, was wrong. 
With Windsor, the marriage of incrementalism and sexual orientation jurisprudence 
has reared the development of an alternative line of review for discrimination based 
on the animus, and not on traits that may or may not render recipients of 
discrimination any favorable scrutiny. This development of animus-focused 
jurisprudence for identity—starting with sexual identity—should figure in the next 
steps forth in the incrementalism that has brought about the federal recognition of 
married same-sex couples. As we have seen, this development itself—although 
favorable so far for sexual minorities—is larger and bigger than same-sex marriage. 
Animus-focused jurisprudence could, if carefully harnessed going forth for future 
litigation over sexuality, transform the discourse and doctrine covering identity 
politics in the climate of American legal consciousness. 
With this positive advance then, how can any thoughts turn to stormy weather? 
Where is the tempest that is gathering? Where did it go? The storm clouds seem to 
have dissipated; the lightning ceased. And the voices that underlined NOM’s 
message appear much less relevant.  
Likewise, is the sky as lucid, with the sun so illuminating that the only problem 
that seems pertinent is a glare on an electronic tablet? No. No beaches stand before 
us, not just yet, and no celebratory drinks are being poured from the bar—just the 
idea of common ground made more vividly by Windsor, incrementalism, animus-
focused jurisprudence, and hopefully the future that stems from all of this.  
As far as their rights are concerned, sexual minorities are no longer enduring that 
storm of historical persecution, but are somewhere in between downpour and clarity. 
It is possible that they may never reach that beach, to really sit on those lounge 
chairs and have full freedom to enjoy personal dignity and autonomy. But that is not 
what the beach in the Amazon commercial really signifies. Instead, that beach is an 
aspiration, a good mirage of sorts, a kind of idealistic paradise in which the closer we 
approach, the further off it remains as an eidos of sexual identity politics. Our 
recognition of that goal is favorable; our steps to reaching that goal are even more 
laudable. The motion that propels us closer inch-by-inch covers exudes significance 
and takes us far beyond same-sex marriage.  
With the steps accomplished so far on this incremental journey, the march to 
marriage equality has finally brought forth an examination of personal dignity and 
commonality that concerned the expressive regulations of sexual minorities; each 
shift away from regulations restricting identity expression throughout the 
incrementalist journey federally has been a moment where antigay essentialism was 
abandoned, and in its place the law moved steps closer to the center of enquiry 
where, as far as gay rights is concerned, that essentialism is being eviscerated by 
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animus-focused jurisprudence that poses significance in constitutional jurisprudence. 
The federal government now leaves same-sex marriages alone. The law is beginning 
to expose the traditional animus that has oppressed sexual minorities. These 
developments have come a long way, and they must unfold positively for the 
expression of sexual identities. Though the question will always seek what the next 
development is, there are two things for certain: first, progress will be incremental; 
and secondly, the implications, of course, will be huge.  
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